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CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION 
1. Background 
1.1. The evolution of cybercrime 
 
As the internet continues to evolve and people become more reliant on it, individuals, 
communities and nations are becoming increasingly vulnerable to the threat of the 
cyber-criminal.1 Due to intensified media attention2 and a number of recent 
sophisticated cyber-attacks,3 the impression has started to form that cyber-incidents 
are becoming more frequent, more organised, more costly and altogether more 
dangerous.4 
 
In South Africa, the Department of Justice estimated that the damage caused by cyber-
related offences is around one billion Rand annually.5 More specifically, the Norton 
Report6 revealed that the third highest number of cybercrime victims globally belong 
to South Africa experiencing a loss in excess of R2.2bn due to internet fraud and 
phishing attacks annually.  
 
                                            
1P Hunton ‘A rigorous approach to formalising the technical investigation stages of cybercrime and 
criminality within a UK law enforcement environment’ (2011) 7 Digital Investigation 1. 
2There is an increasing amount of focus on cybercrime in the media recently. For instance, the FBI 
made public their most wanted list for cybercrime (M Park ‘Meet the FBI’s top 5 Most Wanted for cyber 
crimes’ CNN and cyber attacks on the TalkTalk website and NASA were highlighted (‘TalkTalk hack 
attack: Friends admit cyber crime charges’ BBC News. 
 
3South Africa is believed to be affected by the biggest global cyberattack.  This attack occurred through 
hackers who gained access to more than 100,000 computers globally and used malware to hold these 
computer systems hostage until money was paid to unlock it.  Sixteen hospitals in the United Kingdom 
were shut down due to patient files becoming inaccessible by hospital staff. T Mulaudzi ‘SA affected in 
Global Cyberattack’ Eyewitness News 13 May 2017. 
4MD Cavelty ‘Breaking the Cyber-Security Dilemma: Aligning Security Needs and Removing 
Vulnerabilities’ 2014 Science and Engineering Ethics 702. 
5‘The Department of Justice and Constitutional Development Justice publishes Cybercrimes and 
Cybersecurity Bill for public comment’ 28 August 2015. 
6This report is based on research that is conducted to analyse the current state of cybercrime and the 
impact it has on consumers. ‘2013 Norton Report’ Business Media Mags. 
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Cyberspace and the internet7 have become essentials in the world today.8  In 2016 the 
estimated number of internet users in South Africa was recorded at 28 580 290 which 
is roughly 52 percent of the South African population.9  The fast development of 
technology is a huge advantage benefiting society in fields such as medicine, 
information technology and communications, engineering and the sciences.10 
 
However, in as much as there are many benefits that the advances in technology hold, 
there are also disadvantages in that it carries the potential to be exploited by criminal 
activities such as computer-based fraud, sexual exploitation and illegal interception of 
private communications.11  Van der Merwe suggests that a computer is just another 
tool that criminals can use to commit crimes which now fall under the umbrella of 
‘information and communications technology’ (‘ICT’) crime.12 
 
There are various types of cybercrimes threatening society today, with one of its 
definitions being ‘any criminal activity that involves a computer’.13 This can be further 
divided into two categories, the first being any crime that has not been in existence 
before the advent of the computer and is reliant on the computer for execution; for 
example, hacking, cracking, sniffing and the production and dissemination of malicious 
code are examples of such crimes. The other category is crimes that have been in 
existence for centuries but have now started to be performed in the cyber environment 
– internet fraud, possession and distribution of child pornography, to name a few, form 
part of this category of cyber-crime.14   
                                            
7 Cyberspace differs from the internet in that ‘Cyberspace denotes the “place” where communication on 
the internet takes place and exists everywhere that there are telephone wires, coaxial cables, optical 
fibres cables or electromagnetic waves.’ S Papadopoulos et al. Cyberlaw@SA III The law of the internet 
in South Africa 3ed (2012) 335. 
8 As at 31 March 2017 there are an estimated 3, 731, 973, 423 internet users trustingly participating in 
sending, receiving, storing, uploading and downloading data in this sphere.  ‘Internet World Stats’ 
available at http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm accessed on 14 April 2017. 
9 ‘South Africa Internet Users’ Internet live Stats available at http://www.internetlivestats.com/internet-
users/south-africa/, accessed on 14 April 2017.    
10JB Hill and NE Marion Introduction to Cybercrime: Computer crimes, laws, and policing in the 21st 
century (2016) 10. 
11 M Grobler et al ‘Preparing SA for Cyber Crime and Cyber Defense’ (2013) 11(7) Journal of Systemics, 
Cybernetics and Informatics 36. 
12 DP Van der Merwe et al Information and Communications Technology Law 2 ed, (2016) 63. 
13 S Snail ‘Cyber Crime in South Africa – Hacking, cracking, and other unlawful online activities’, 2009(1) 
Journal of Information, Law & Technology (JILT) 2. 
14 Ibid. 
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Cybercrime has become a pressing reality in society.  According to the Cyber Crime 
and Cyber Security Trends in Africa report,15 statistics show that of the 602 million 
victims of cybercrime globally, 8.8 million were South Africans in the past year alone. 
One would expect that with the high number of cybercrime victims would come a high 
rate of cybercrime prosecutions and convictions. However, according to the latest 
SAPS crime statistics,16 there have been no recorded convictions in this category of 
crimes.  
 
This research is premised on the fact that a lack of cybercrime convictions in South 
Africa is directly linked to the current legislation that governs the search and seizure of 
electronic evidence, and its practical application being inadequate and out of date. This 
dissertation will aim to critically analyse the legislation that governs search and seizure 
of electronic evidence with a view to proposing amendments and/or solutions to 
address the lack of cybercrime convictions in South Africa. 
 
It is important to note that the search and seizure of electronic evidence is not limited 
to cybercrime but can feature in most areas of law such as civil litigation, labour 
proceedings and administrative tribunals.  Electronic evidence includes social media, 
emails, voice recordings, WhatsApp messages and the like.17 However, to provide a 
more nuanced context, the analysis of search and seizure of electronic evidence in 
this research is limited to and discussed within the confines of cybercrime.  
 
1.2 Search and seizure of electronic evidence in the investigation of 
cybercrime  
 
The Electronic Communications and Transactions Act18 was promulgated in 2002 and 
is currently the only piece of legislation that specifically regulates cybercrime in South 
Africa – it also governs the search and seizure of electronic evidence19 in conjunction 
                                            
15 This report presents detailed technical data that is collected in respect of Cybersecurity trends and 
threats in Africa.  The data is collected through voluntary country surveys which poses questions 
regarding the implementation of policy and legal frameworks that aim to address the technical 
challenges that are experienced.  ‘Cyber Crime and Cyber Security Trends in Africa, 2016’ Global Forum 
on Cyber Expertise available at https://www.thegfce.com/initiatives/c/cybersecurity-and-cybercrime-
trends-in-africa, accessed on 14 April 2017. 
16  Crime Statistics 2015/2016, South African Police Service Department of Police. 
17 E A Vincze ‘Challenges in digital forensics’ (2016) 17(2) Police Practice and Research 185.   
18 Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002 (hereinafter referred to as the ECT Act). 
19 S Papadopoulos et al (note 7 above; 317).   
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with the Criminal Procedure Act,20 the common law, other procedural statutes,21 and 
the Constitution.22   
 
The ECT Act aims to, inter alia, promote legal certainty with respect to electronic 
communications and transactions, and develop a safe environment for business, 
consumers and government to conduct and utilise electronic transactions.23   
 
The prioritisation of cyber threats in financial year 2014/2015 by the South African 
government, prompted the upcoming regulation of cybercrime and aspects of search 
and seizure by the Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill.24  The Bill aims to identify 
cyber-related offences and criminal liability associated with these crimes.25 It further 
imposes penalties related to cybercrime and regulates the powers of investigation of 
cybercrime.26   
 
The Department of Justice and Constitutional Development has introduced the 
Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill in its process of reviewing and aligning current 
cybersecurity laws27 to the National Cybersecurity Policy Framework. This 
Framework28 provides, inter alia, measures to address cybercrime irregularities and to 
develop, review and update existing substantive and procedural laws. 
 
With cybercrime being committed in a different environment than physical crime, the 
type of evidence differs too, requiring a change in legal procedures and Information 
and Communication Technology (“ICT”) forensics.29 In the physical world, searching 
                                            
20 Act 51 of 1977 (hereinafter referred to as the “CPA”). 
21 Civil Proceedings Evidence Act 25 of 1965 and the Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988. 
22 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the “Constitution”). 
23 Section 2 of the ECT Act. 
24 Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill B-2017 (hereinafter referred to as the “Bill”). 
25 N Mapisa-Nqakula ‘Justice, Crime Prevention and Security post-SoNA Cluster media briefing’ 2015 
Government Communications. 
26 Memorandum on the objects of the Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill (2017) 25. 
27 Media Briefing: Statement by the Deputy Minister of justice and Constitutional Development, the Hon 
JH Jeffery, MP on the new proposed Cybercrime and Cybersecurity Bill, 19 January 2017 Department 
of Justice and Constitutional Development. 
28 ‘This South African National Cybersecurity Policy Framework is necessitated to ensure a focussed 
and an all-embracing safety and security response in respect of the Cybersecurity environment and 
establishes and addresses issues such as development and implementation of a government led 
cybersecurity approach to cybersecurity threats and fighting cybercrime through the promotion of 
coordinated approaches and planning and the creation or required staffing and infrastructure.’ The 
National Cybersecurity Policy Framework, 2015.  
29DP Van der Merwe … et al (note 12 above; 63). 
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for evidence at a crime scene would include fingerprints, DNA, gunpowder residue and 
the like, however the search for electronic evidence includes artefacts and electronic 
equipment that would indicate use, ownership or possession of electronic evidence.30  
 
Therefore it is clear that the foundation of search and seizure of evidence shifts from 
the ‘material world to the virtual world of cyberspace.’31 As opposed to tangible 
evidence, digital evidence32 can be found, for example, on electronic devices left 
behind at the scene of a crime33 and in order to successfully arrest and prosecute 
criminals, consistent and clearly defined forensic procedures need to be followed by 
investigators.34 Consequently, the field of ICT forensics35 is aimed at utilising proven 
methods to preserve, collect, identify, analyse and interpret electronic evidence 
derived from electronic sources for the purpose of presenting this evidence before a 
court of law.36   
 
This research will focus on the search and seizure of electronic evidence in South 
Africa, in the context of cybercrime. The primary legislative mechanisms that currently 
regulate search and seizure of electronic evidence in South Africa are the CPA37 
(provides search and seizure procedures), and the ECT Act (provides cyber inspectors 
with additional powers of search and seizure).38 The Bill will be studied as it is the 
proposed future law that will govern the cyber or electronic environment. 
 
 
                                            
30 S C McQuade Encyclopaedia of Cybercrime (2009) 29. 
31 GP Bouwer ‘Search and seizure of electronic evidence: Division of the traditional one-step process 
into a new two-step process in a South African context’ (2014) 2 SACJ 156. 
32 Digital evidence and electronic evidence will be used interchangeably in this research paper. 
33 JB Hill and NE Marion (note 10 above, 105). 
34 M Reith et al… ‘An Examination of Digital Forensic Models’ 2002 (1) International Journal of Digital 
Evidence 2. 
35 ICT Forensics is a separate complex topic that requires far more in depth discussion which is not 
included in this paper however it is worth mentioning as the practical implementation of the search and 
seizure of electronic evidence requires the application of techniques that are foundational to ICT 
forensics.  
36 V Baryamureeba and F Tushabe ‘The Enhanced Digital Investigation Process Model’ 2004 The Digital 
Forensic Research Conference 4. 
37 Defined (note 20 above). 
38 A Irons and J Ophoff ‘Aspects of digital forensics in South Africa’ 2016(11) Interdisciplinary Journal 
of Information, Knowledge, and Management 277. 
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2. Overview of the current South African legislation relevant to the search and 
seizure of electronic evidence 
It is critical to acknowledge that in any criminal matter in South Africa, the Constitution 
must be considered in the context of an accused person’s right to a fair trial where 
evidence is unconstitutionally obtained.39 However, the constitutional court has 
decided that in certain instances, even evidence that has been obtained 
unconstitutionally can be admitted into evidence.40 
 
2.1 The Constitution 
 
The Constitution is the sovereign law of South Africa and since its enactment, 
additional constraints have been imposed on the powers of search and seizure.41  The 
relevance of analysing the Constitution is that if evidence is unlawfully obtained (by 
infringing a Constitutional right), it may well be inadmissible and render the trial 
unfair.42 That being said, constitutional rights are not absolute – moreover, judicial 
discretion will dictate whether unconstitutionally obtained electronic evidence will be 
admissible or not.43  
  
Search and seizures that are authorised by law (whether by statute or common law) 
are established as lawful but those enabling laws can be criticised for infringing on 
constitutional rights.44 
 
                                            
39 M Watney ‘Admissibility of Electronic Evidence in Criminal Proceedings: An outline of the South 
African Legal Position’ 2009 JILT 39. 
40 Key v Attorney-General, Cape Provincial Division 1996 (6) BCLR 788 (CC). 
41 V Basdeo ‘The Constitutional validity of search and seizure powers in South African criminal 
procedure’ 2009 (12) 4 PER 307. 
42 S 35(5) of the Constitution provides for the exclusionary rule. See also Harvey v Niland 2016 (2) SA 
436 (ECG). In this case,  the court held that gaining access to a person’s Facebook account without 
their permission constitutes hacking and falls under the criminal conduct provided for by S86(1) of the 
ECT Act. It decided that the evidence extracted from Facebook was admissible even though it 
constituted a crime and infringed on the right to privacy. This was decided within the facts of the case 
and shows that constitutional rights are not absolute.  
43 PJ Schwikkard and SE van der Merwe Principles of Evidence 4ed (2016) 429. See also A Bellengere 
et al… The Law of Evidence in South Africa: Basic Principles (2013) 76. 
44 I Currie and J De Waal The Bill Of Rights Handbook 6ed (2013) 309. 
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The issue is that the right to a fair trial can be infringed by search and seizure 
procedures at the pre-trial stage.45  Accused persons have the right to remain silent46 
and the privilege against self-incrimination.47 The state bears the onus of proving its 
case beyond reasonable doubt, and the accused is not obliged to disclose or provide 
any information or documents which may strengthen or assist the state’s case.48  The 
discussion of the Constitution entails evaluating whether or not the accused’s action 
of providing passwords to secure devices or removing encryption constitutes self-
incrimination resulting in unconstitutionally obtained evidence.  
 
2.2 Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002 
 
The ECT Act is aimed at enabling and facilitating ‘electronic communications and 
transactions in the public interest.’49  The ECT Act defines electronic terms such as 
data, IP address, data message and other applicable terms; further, it criminalises 
specific forms of electronic conduct.50 In addition, the ECT Act provides for the search 
and seizure of electric evidence.51 
 
The ECT Act further makes provision for the appointment of cyber inspectors52 and 
their powers; the powers to inspect, search and seize; obtaining a warrant and the 
preservation of confidentiality. Cyber inspectors are able to access information or enter 
any premises in the furtherance of an investigation into alleged cybercrime.53  As much 
as this role was created and expected to become a reality,54 there has yet to be an 
appointment of a cyber inspector.55 As a result of the defunct position of the cyber 
inspector, the CPA and common law are relied upon in the regulation of the search 
and seizure of electronic evidence.  
                                            
45 V Basdeo ‘A critique of search and seizure in terms of a search warrant in South African criminal 
procedure’ (2015)30 SAPL 156. 
46 Section 35(1) (a) of the Constitution. 
47 Section 35(3) (j) of the Constitution. 
48 Fedics Group (Pty) Ltd v Matus 1998 (2) SA 617 (C). 
49 Section 2(1) of the ECT Act. 
50 J Omar ‘Legal Terminology: Criminal Law, Criminal Procedure and Evidence’ 2016 SALJ 229. 
51 Section 80 – Section 84 of the ECT Act. 
52 Cyber inspectors will be analysed with more detail in a future chapter. 
53 Basdeo et al (note 45 above, 153).  
54 R Weideman ‘Here come the cyber inspectors’ (2003) ITWeb Internet available at 
http://www.itweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=81319, accessed on 21 April 
2017. 
55 S v Miller [2015] 4 All SA 503 (WCC) at para 56. 
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This dissertation will investigate whether the non-existence of cyber inspectors 
constitutes one of the main contributing factors to the lack of cybercrime investigations. 
 
2.3 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 
 
The ECT Act states that the CPA applies with the necessary changes to search and 
seizures in terms of this Act.56 It is therefore an intention that these two Acts work 
together for the purpose of search and seizure.57  
 
The CPA provides the basis of search and seizure procedures whether it is with or 
without a search warrant58 and the authority to enter into premises.59 The CPA 
provides for the search of any premises under certain circumstances set out in the 
CPA such as a search in connection with State security or any offence60 or for the 
purposes of obtaining evidence.61   
 
Chapter 2 of the CPA62 governs the search and seizure of physical evidence.63  The 
CPA was created in a time where data messages where not fully envisaged, and the 
only need was for search and seizure of tangible evidence and not electronic 
evidence.64 However, the CPA can be used for collecting electronic evidence, 
providing ‘for search warrants, searches and seizures without a warrant, the entering 
of premises, and the forfeiture and disposal of property connected with offences.’65  
 
The issue arises from the CPA’s applicability to electronic evidence with regards to 
cyber specific terminology and procedures. Currently the CPA is being applied to 
                                            
56 Section 82 (3) of the ECT Act. 
57DP Van der Merwe (note 123 above; 87). 
58 Section 21(2) of the CPA states “A search warrant issued under subsection (1) shall require a police 
official to seize the article in question and shall to that end authorize such police official to search any 
person identified in the warrant, or to enter and search any premises identified in the warrant and to 
search any person found on or at such premises.” See also Chapter 9 Search and Seizure of JJ 
Joubert…et al Criminal Procedure Handbook 11ed (2014) for more context. 
59  VG Hiemstra Introduction to The Law of Criminal Procedure 2ed (1985) 6. 
60 Section 25 of the CPA. 
61 Section 26 of the CPA. 
62 51 of 1977. 
63 GP Bouwer (note 31 above; 158). 
64 E Du Toit ‘Search and seizure of electronic evidence’ 2016 Commentary on the Criminal Procedure 
Act 13. 
65 V Basdeo ‘The legal Challenges of search and seizure of electronic evidence in South African criminal 
procedure: A comparative analysis’ (2012) 2 South African Journal of Criminal Justice 204. 
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matters that include the element of electronic evidence. 66 However, there is still a need 
for legislation to govern the electronic environment in order to provide clarity and 
certainty instead of depending solely on the interpretation of the judiciary. Therefore 
the promulgation of the Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill is expected to add to the 
existing legislative framework.  
 
3. The Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill67 
 
This Bill was drafted with the aim of regulating cybercrimes and cybersecurity in South 
Africa.68 The greater purpose of the Bill lends itself to building safer communities by 
enhancing cybersecurity69 and further brings more clarity to cybercrime by creating 
additional offences (not defined in the ECT Act) and prescribing penalties.70   
 
More specifically, with reference to the issues addressed in this dissertation, the Bill 
now defines previously uncertain terms such as article, computer and computer 
systems.71 Chapter 5 of the Bill deals with the powers to investigate, search and 
access or seize, and includes the direction to the Cabinet member responsible for 
policing to issue Standard Operating Procedures (for the collection of electronic 
evidence) within six months of the enactment of the Bill.72  These Standard Operating 
Procedures should be adhered to by the SAPS or any other investigating officer in the 
process of investigating any offence set out in the Bill.73 This dissertation will aim to 
reveal how the Bill will affect the current legal position and whether it will be able to 
work in conjunction with the existing rules of search and seizure set out in the CPA. 
 
 
 
                                            
66 Currently electronic evidence is accepted under the definition of “document” in s 221(5) of the CPA. 
See S v Harper 1981 (1) SA 88 (D) and S v Brown 2016 (1) SACR 206 (WCC).This will be further 
discussed in the following chapter together with the need to introduce cyber specific terminology into 
the legislative framework. 
67 B-2017 (hereinafter referred to as “the Bill”). 
68 Memorandum on the objects of the Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill (2017) (note 26 above, 1). 
69 Media Briefing (note 27 above). 
70 Discussion of the Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill (2015) available at 
http://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/invitations/CyberCrimesDiscussionDocument2015.pdf. 
71 Section 1 of the Bill. 
72 Section 24 of the Bill. 
73 Ibid. 
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4. International Best Practice 
 
With constitutional principles in mind, ‘when interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, 
tribunal or forum must consider international law; and may consider foreign law'.74  It 
is in that vein that this research paper will address international and foreign law 
principles regarding the search and seizure of electronic evidence. 
 
This comparative study will be conducted with the aim of evaluating if South African 
legislation is line with international best practice.  Stemming from this evaluation will 
be key lessons that South Africa can learn from other, arguably, faster developing 
jurisdictions in terms of legislative progressions and practical solutions of dealing with 
the search and seizure of electronic evidence in the cybercrime context.  In this regard 
the Council of Europe's75 Cybercrime Convention (hereinafter referred to as the 
“Cybercrime Convention”),76 the United States of America and Australia will be studied. 
 
The Cybercrime Convention aims to, amongst other provisions, provide for domestic 
criminal procedural law powers that are required for investigation and prosecution of 
cybercrime and the collection of electronic evidence; and making provision for 
administration of international co-operation.77  
 
The search and seizure of electronic evidence in the United States of America must 
be analysed as it is known for its fast and early development of technology which 
unfortunately also meant that it fell victim to cybercrime much sooner.78 As a result the 
legislature in the USA was quick to start creating laws to combat cybercrime.79 Most 
importantly, legal rules for search and seizure of evidence are set out in Rule 41 of the 
                                            
74 Section 39 (1) (b) and (c) of the Constitution. 
75 ‘The Council of Europe promotes human rights through international conventions, such as the 
Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence and the 
Convention on Cybercrime. It monitors member states' progress in these areas and makes 
recommendations through independent expert monitoring bodies. For More information see 
https://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/home. 
76 Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime European Treaty Series – No. 185 available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2014_2019/documents/libe/dv/7_conv_budapest_/7_conv_b
udapest_en.pdf. 
77 Explanatory Report to the Convention on Cybercrime European Treaty Series No. 185 available at 
https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=0900001
6800cce5b. 
78 DP Van der Merwe (note 12 above; 93). 
79 Ibid. 
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Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.80 This Rule makes provision for searching 
electronic storage media, seizing electronically stored information, where such media 
or information is concealed through technological means or where protected 
computers have been damaged without authorisation.81 
 
The USA experiences a similar challenge as South Africa in terms of the lack of 
successful convictions.82 It is important to research the manner in which the USA deals 
with this issue despite having electronic evidence specific legislation in place and the 
way in which it overcomes constitutional hurdles.   
 
In Australia, search and seizure procedures for criminal matters are governed by the 
Crimes Act.83 More importantly, this Act makes provisions for electronic searches by 
allowing the entrance of electronic equipment onto specified premises for the purpose 
of utilising forensic imaging programs in investigation.84  Further, under this Act, the 
use of any electronic equipment (such as computers) that is present on the premises 
may be utilised.85  
 
It is beneficial to compare these Acts to South African legislation in respect of defining 
terms and implementing specific search and seizure legislative provisions relating to 
electronic evidence. It is further important to review judicial decisions of the American 
and Australian courts to provide a view that will aid South African judicial officers in 
interpretation and application of cybercrime specific legislation and guide the practical 
application of investigative methods used in the search and seizure of electronic 
evidence. 
5. Statement of Purpose and Rationale   
 
The purpose of this study is to evaluate the current South African legislation, policies 
and procedures relating to the search and seizure of electronic evidence in the 
                                            
80 GP Bouwer (note 31 above; 163). 
81 Rule 41 (b) (6) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 2016. 
82 NY Conteh and PJ Schmick ‘Cybersecurity: risks, vulnerabilities and countermeasures to prevent 
social engineering attacks’ (2016) 6(23) International Journal of advanced Computer Research 33. 
831914 (Cth). G Urbas and KR Choo ‘Resource materials on technology-enabled crime’ 2008 
Australian Institute of Criminology 28. 
84 Section 3K of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth). 
85 Section 3L of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth). 
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investigation of cybercrime and analyse if the enactment of the Cybersecurity and 
Cybercrimes Bill will address the present shortcomings effectively or whether more 
insight from international best practices should be considered. 
 
The rationale for this study is based on investigating the difference between the high 
increase in the rate of cybercrime being committed and its corresponding low 
conviction rate.  One would expect high cybercrime conviction rates in light of the 
increase in the rate of cybercrime, however, the opposite is evident.  It is therefore 
imperative to study the legal framework and its practical application governing the 
search and seizure of electronic evidence in the investigation of cybercrime in order to 
uncover its shortcomings and recommend means of improvement.   
 
In addition, the Cybersecurity and Cybercrimes Bill has not been passed into law as 
yet therefore it has not yet been subject to judicial interpretation. Neither has it passed 
constitutional muster.  It is advantageous to study this Bill now to predict the effect it 
will have on all the stakeholders involved in the search and seizure of electronic 
evidence.    
6. Structure of dissertation 
Chapter 2 of this dissertation deals with the current regulations governing search and 
seizure of electronic evidence in South Africa.  The collection of the electronic evidence 
is vital in the successful investigation of cybercrime hence it is important to pay 
attention to these regulations in light of its practical application, judicial interpretation 
and economic impact.  The main focus of this chapter entails scrutinizing the ECT Act 
and CPA.  
 
An analysis of the salient provisions of the Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill will be 
done in this chapter 3.  These will be compared to the existing regulatory framework 
and relevant distinctions will be drawn in an attempt to reveal whether the proposed 
changes will adequately address the shortcomings of its predecessors.  An anticipated 
limitation is the lack of case law relevant to this topic that can aid in interpretation and 
application of the law.   
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Chapter 4 entails an examination of the regulatory frameworks of international and 
foreign jurisdictions (USA and Australia) in order to conduct a comparative study 
depicting the areas succeeding and/or lacking in South African law.  Considering 
international best practice will assist in providing recommendations as well as to draw 
a conclusion on whether South Africa is on par with other nations in terms of its legal 
development. 
 
The last chapter will conclude this research paper by summarising all arguments and 
findings presented as well as by providing a thoroughly researched set of 
recommendations that will assist in developing South African law to meet international 
standards and improve operating procedures within the country.   
7. Research Methodology 
 
The research conducted for this dissertation will be qualitative in the form of desktop 
research.  Legislation such as the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 
will be analysed for the current position in South Africa and the Cybercrimes and 
Cybersecurity Bill will be analysed for the future position together with various other 
applicable legislation and policies on this topic.  Relevant case law, be it reported or 
unreported judgements, will be looked at to obtain a view of the attitude of the courts 
toward cybercrime.   
 
Further, literature in the form of published textbooks, journal articles, newspaper and 
media reports will be utilised as a basis for discussion around the topic as well as to 
either support or contrast arguments being made.  In addition, legislation and journal 
articles published by legal academics from foreign jurisdictions relating to the search 
and seizure of electronic evidence will be used to do a comparative study between 
South Africa and other jurisdictions.  
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CHAPTER TWO - CURRENT LEGAL POSITION IN SOUTH AFRICAN REGARDING 
SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE 
1. Introduction 
Cybercrime is not a new phenomenon to South Africa. Electronic devices and 
technology such as the internet, cell phones, podcasts, and digital cameras to name a 
few, are used as a medium of communications, transactions, interactions and the 
recording of events.86 With the advancement of technology comes the increased risk 
of computers becoming either the tools or targets of crime.87  
 
This chapter aims to identify and critically analyse the current legal framework that 
governs the search and seizure of electronic evidence in a criminal context in South 
Africa.  This will be done by evaluating, firstly, the definition of electronic evidence, 
secondly, a constitutional perspective of search and seizure, and lastly the search and 
seizure provisions of the relevant legislation. In addition, relevant judicial decisions will 
be considered to uncover the interpretation of the applicable law, and its practical 
application and impact.  
2. Defining electronic evidence 
2.1. Overview  
 
This increase in the use of technology has resulted in the creation of new laws 
depicting the criminal law’s reaction to this change in social conditions.88 In South 
Africa, the law of evidence is not codified in a single piece of legislation and spans a 
variety of sources which range from the Civil Proceedings Evidence Act89 to the 
Criminal Procedure Act90 and to the Computer Evidence Act,91 which has now been 
                                            
86 EA Vincze (note 17 above, 186) See also A Bellengere et al… The Law of Evidence in South Africa: 
Basic Principles (2013) 73. 
87 South African Law Commission Discussion Paper 99 (Project 108) 'Computer related crime: 
Preliminary proposals for reform in respect of unauthorised access to computers, unauthorised 
modification of computer data and software applications and related procedural aspects' (2001) 3. 
88J Omar (note 50 above, 229). 
89 Act 25 of 1965. 
90 Act 51 of 1977. 
91 Act 57 of 1983. 
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repealed by the most recent, and primary regulator of electronic evidence in South 
Africa: the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act.92 
 
Moreover, electronic evidence does not form part of a sui generis category in the South 
African law of evidence, but is admitted to court as documentary evidence in the form 
of a document, or real evidence in the form of a thing.93  
 
In South African law, the term electronic evidence does not exist – rather, the term 
data message is used in section 1 of the ECT Act reflecting the United Nations Model 
Law on Electronic Commerce, 1996.94 It was never the intention of the Model Law to 
limit the concept of data messages to only means of communication but rather include 
all kinds of messages that are ‘generated, stored or communicated’ in electronic form 
inclusive of computer records.’95 
 
Nevertheless, electronic evidence has also been defined as ‘information of probative 
force stored or transmitted in digital format’96 or as ‘electronically stored information 
that can be used as evidence in a legal action.’97 Examples of electronic evidence that 
can be admitted into evidence at a trial are images and sound extracted from a cell 
phone.98 Further computer evidence, digital video, digital fax machines and digital 
audio are all classified as electronic evidence.99  
 
Similarly, Nieman sets forth two different types of electronic evidence, one being 
physical and the other being logical.100 Physical electronic evidence is described as 
                                            
92 A Bellengere et al (note 87 above, 73). This is seen as problematic which is duly noted by the SA Law 
Reform Commission to be discussed later on in this paper. 
93 PJ Schwikkard and SE van der Merwe (note 43 above, 438). 
94 This definition is based on the definition of ‘data message’ provided for in Article 2 of the Model Law 
to be further described in paragraph 2.3.1 of this Chapter. See S Papadopoulos (note 7 above, 319). 
95 South African Law Reform Commission, Issue Paper 27, Project 126: Review of the Law of Evidence. 
Electronic evidence in criminal and civil proceedings: admissibility and related issues (accessed through 
http://salawreform.justice.gov.za/ipapers/ip27_pr126_2010.pdf on 2 July 2017). 
96 GP Bouwer (note 31 above, 159). 
97 P Volonino ‘Electronic evidence and computer forensics’ 2003 Communication of the Association for 
Information Systems 462. 
98 Motata v Nair No and Another 2009 (1) SACR 263 (T). 
99 Y Shin ‘New Model for Cyber Crime Investigation Procedure’ 2011 (2) Journal of Next Generation 
Information Technology 1. 
100 A Nieman Search And Seizure, Production And Preservation Of Electronic Evidence (unpublished 
LLD Thesis, North-West University, 2006) 36. 
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machinery and hard drives, whereas logical electronic evidence is said to live within 
log files and is embedded in memory and software.101 
 
Mason and Seng propose that the definition of electronic evidence comprises of three 
different elements.102 Firstly, data which ‘includes all forms of evidence created, 
manipulated or stored in a device that can, in its widest meaning, be considered a 
computer.’103 Secondly, it refers to various devices that can store or transmit data such 
as computers or telephone systems.104 Lastly, the definition restricts data to that which 
is relevant to the case at hand when deciding on the admissibility of the electronic 
evidence.105 
 
The above definitional issues notwithstanding, the admissibility of electronic evidence 
is not central to the theme of this paper but with the aim of completeness it is beneficial 
to note that the admissibility of any evidence is based on its relevance to the facts at 
issue.106 Admissibility is further dependent on whether or not the evidence may be 
excluded by any other law, or precluded due to the manner in which it was obtained.107  
One ultimately analyses the probative value and relevance of the evidence – while 
considering whether the evidence may cause prejudice to one or more parties at 
trial.108  Each case is decided on its own merits, and the judicial officer will ultimately 
decide whether evidence is admissible or not.109 
 
2.2. Electronic evidence – civil  
 
As noted above, the ECT Act attempts to define electronic evidence110 by defining data 
as the ‘electronic representations of information in any form’.111  It further defines a 
“data message” as ‘data generated, sent received or stored by electronic means and 
                                            
101 Ibid. 
102 S Mason and D Seng Electronic Evidence 4ed (2017) 19. 
103 Ibid. 
104 Ibid, 20. 
105 Ibid. 
106 R v Trupedo 1920 AD 58 at 62. 
107 PJ Schwikkard (note 43 above, 438). 
108 Ibid. 
109 Ibid. 
110 PJ Schwikkard ‘Evidence’ 2003 SACJ 90. 
111 Section 1 of the ECT Act. 
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includes voice, where the voice is used in an automated transaction; and a stored 
record.’112  
 
Zeffertt is of the view that the ECT Act aimed to provide for the admissibility of 
information or data arising from electronic communications transactions.113 Therefore, 
from the perspective of the admissibility of electronic evidence, rules that apply to both 
documentary and real evidence are applicable.114  
 
2.3. Electronic evidence – criminal  
 
From a criminal law perspective, electronic evidence is regulated under the CPA which 
makes provision for a document, which 'includes any device whereby information can 
be recorded or stored.’115 This provision places a limitation of the extent to which 
electronic evidence could be covered as a document in the CPA by only making 
reference to the functionality of recording and storing. Early interpretations of a 
“document” did not include computers as the operational functionality of a computer 
exceeded recording and storage of information.116  However, the courts have decided 
that computer print-outs fall within the ordinary meaning of a document as they consist 
of typed words and figures thus leading to the admissibility of computer print-outs in 
criminal proceedings.117 
 
In addition, in the case of S v Brown,118 the court held that photographic images that 
were downloaded from a mobile phone and in general ‘generated, stored and 
transmitted by an electronic device’ should be dealt with as documentary evidence as 
opposed to real evidence. Even though this case does not directly deal with the 
definition of electronic evidence, it illustrates that electronic evidence has been 
admitted into court in criminal proceedings through the CPA.  
 
                                            
112 Ibid. 
113 DT Zeffert et al The South African Law of Evidence (2003) 699. 
114 Ibid. 
115 Section 221(5) of the CPA. 
116 J Hofman 'Electronic evidence in criminal cases' (2006) 19 South African Computer Journal 257. 
117 S v Harper 1981 (1) SA 88 (D). See also S v Ningisa and Others 2013 (2) NR 504 (SC). 
118 2016 (1) SACR 206 (WCC). 
21 
 
 
2.4. Conclusion regarding the current definition of electronic evidence 
The concept of electronic evidence has no standard definition. This is required in order 
to achieve fairness and consistency. Therefore, it is submitted that the definition of 
electronic evidence should be standardised and defined by law in order to mitigate 
against any misunderstanding and contradictory interpretations. This is important 
because, as noted above, electronic evidence forms part of all areas of law therefore 
it should be defined uniformly across the board. With the introduction of the Bill, South 
African legislation may get closer to defining electronic evidence.119 
 
3.  Search and Seizure of electronic evidence: current legal position   
3.1. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
 
The introduction of the Constitution brought about restrictions onto search and seizure 
powers, prescribing standards which legal powers are measured against.120 However, 
section 36 of the Constitution provides that these rights are subject to reasonable and 
justifiable limitations that are imposed by a law of general application.121 Certain 
constitutional aspects are discussed below in the context of search and seizure of 
electronic evidence within the cyber-realm. 
 
 3.1.1. The right to a fair trial   
 
Section 35 (3)(j) of the Constitution reads: 
 
Every accused person has a right to a fair trial, which includes the right not to be compelled to 
give self-incriminating evidence 
 
The right to a fair trial and the privilege against self-incrimination122 is provided by both 
the Constitution, and the CPA which provides that ‘no witness shall… be compelled to 
answer any question which he would have not … have been compelled to answer by 
                                            
119 This will be discussed further in the next chapter.  
120 V Basdeo (note 41 above, 307). 
121 Ibid. 
122 Ibid. 
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reason that the answer will expose him to a criminal charge.’123 The right to silence is 
an underpinning mechanism that supports the concept of personal liberty.124 
 
With technological tools such as password encryption and security features on 
devices, the simplest method that investigators can use to gain access to locked 
information is to compel the individual who possesses or controls the access to comply 
with their investigation.125 
 
Investigations that do not comply with constitutional mandates bear the risk of the loss 
of evidence for purposes of prosecution and possible liability on part of the police.126 
From a constitutional perspective, evidence should be excluded if such evidence was 
obtained in a way that violates a constitutional right and if the admission of such 
evidence would render a trial unfair.127 However, the admissibility of evidence, albeit 
collected in an unlawful manner, should be adjudicated upon by a trial court.128  
 
 3.1.2. The right to privacy  
 
Section 14 reads:   
Everyone has the right to privacy, which includes the right not to have their person or home 
searched; their property searched; their possessions seized; or the privacy of their 
communications infringed.129   
 
This is a fundamental human right that is afforded to every citizen of South Africa yet 
these rights impose limitations on the powers of search and seizure.130  Search and 
seizure is deemed to infringe on an individual’s right to privacy, dignity, freedom, 
security and property. Therefore this procedure must be carried out lawfully under the 
                                            
123 Section 203 of the CPA. 
124 Hiemstra (note 59 above, 10). 
125 C Theophilopoulos ‘Electronic documents, encryption, cloud storage and the privilege against self-
incrimination’ 2015 South African Law Journal 597. 
126 V Basdeo (note 45 above, 153). 
127 CG van der Merwe and JE du Plessis (ed) Introduction to the Law of South Africa (2004) 519. 
128 Zuma v National Director of Public Prosecutions 2008 (2) SACR 421 (CC). See also Harvey v Niland 
2016 (2) SA 436 (ECG). 
129 Section 14 of the Constitution. 
130 VM Basdeo et al ‘Search and seizure of evidence in cyber environments: a law enforcement 
dilemma in South African criminal procedure’ (2014)1 Journal of Law, Society and Development 48-
67. 
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guidance of a warrant131 and within the restrictions of the Act to avoid the question of 
whether a search was unlawful and constitutes an infringement of privacy.132   
 
In the case of Harvey v Niland133 the court accepted that Niland’s Facebook 
communications were acquired unlawfully as Harvey hacked into the Niland’s 
Facebook account to gain access to his communications. The court held that this 
constituted a violation of Niland’s privacy.  However, the court held that the admission 
of the electronic evidence depended on, inter alia, the extent to which the right to 
privacy was infringed and whether there was a lawful means to obtain the evidence.  
 
3.2. The Common Law 
 
In South Africa, the law of evidence is governed by both statutory law and common 
law.134 An example of the common law is set out in the case of Ex Parte Minister of 
Justice: In re R v Matemba135 which states that ‘production of documents by a person 
in response to a subpoena… or to other forms of process treating him as a witness… 
may be refused under the protection of the privilege.’136 
 
In terms of criminal proceedings, before the promulgation of the ECT Act, cybercrime 
was dealt with under the common law.137 One such example of the application hereof 
was the case of S v Van den Berg.138 In this matter, the court found that 
misrepresentation via a computer system (electronically) amounted to the same 
conduct as making a false handwritten entry into a ledger account via traditional means 
and the accused was convicted of fraud.  
 
                                            
131 V Basdeo ‘A constitutional perspective of police powers of search and seizure: The legal dilemma 
of warrantless searches and seizures’ (2009) 3 South African Journal of Criminal Justice 404. 
132 VG Hiemstra (note 59 above, 7). 
133 2016 (2) SA 436 (ECG). 
134 M Watney (note 39 above, 2). 
135 1941 AD 75 at 81. 
136 C Theophilopoulos (note 125 above, 603).  
137 S Snail ‘Cyber Crime in South Africa – Hacking, cracking, and other unlawful online activities’, 
2009(1) JILT 2. 
138 S v. Van den Berg 1991 (1) SACR 104 (T). 
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In 1999, the court faced a decision in the case of S v Howard139 on whether the loading 
of a malicious code into a computer network system amounted to the common law 
crime of malicious injury to property.140  Ultimately, the court held that such crime did 
apply to data messages and information, and the accused was accordingly convicted 
and sentenced to five years imprisonment.141   
 
3.3. Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 
 
3.3.1.  Introduction 
 
Chapter 2 of the CPA contains the search and seizure provisions in criminal procedure. 
It provides the legal basis for acquiring warrants for search and seizure and the actions 
to perform in the absence of a warrant.142 As a condition, under chapter 2, search and 
seizure captures the principle that ‘there must be a reasonable belief that a certain 
article located, on a particular premises is connected with the commission of an 
offence.’143 
 
However, the South African Law Commission concluded, in the year 2000, that the 
CPA was designed for the investigation of the physical world and search and seizure 
of physical evidence.144 It appears that the most apparent challenge that the search 
and seizure of electronic evidence poses for the application of the CPA is that this 
piece of legislation was created for a physical world where the seizure of evidence 
related to tangible objects – in tangible places. Computer-generated evidence in the 
realm of cyberspace was not envisaged. 145  
 
The procedure involved in the search and seizure of electronic evidence entails firstly, 
searching for and seizing the physical electronic equipment (e.g. computers and hard 
drives) that may contain potential evidence, and secondly, searching the physical 
                                            
139 Unreported Case no. 41/ 258 / 02, Johannesburg Regional Magistrates Court. 
140 Ibid. 
141 Ibid. 
142 V Basdeo (note 130 above). The ECT Act also provides for cyber inspectors to apply for warrants 
however, these provisions were never realised as the cyber inspector was never appointed to implement 
same. Further discussed in paragraph 2.3.2 of this chapter.  
143 V Basdeo (note 131 above, 405). 
144 South African Law Commission Discussion Paper 99 (note 87 above, 13). 
145 GP Bouwer (note 31 above, 157).  
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electronic equipment and seizing the evidence located therein.146 It is noted that the 
provisions of the CPA can be applied to the first search and seizure of physical 
evidence.147  
 
It is submitted that the provision, however, does not apply to the second search of the 
physical evidence and the seizure of the contents located therein as this would then 
require an application for a second warrant or the details of the second search to be 
identified in the initial warrant.148 Consequently, this second search may be unlawful 
as it constitutes hacking as defined by section 86 of the ECT Act.149 This is one of the 
issues with the current legislation and as such legislative intervention in the form of 
providing specific procedures is required to ensure that the search of the seized 
physical electronic equipment is done lawfully.150  
  
Discussed below are the general provisions of the CPA that pertain to search and 
seizure that govern tangible evidence. Highlighted are the nuances involved in the 
application of these provisions to the search and seizure of electronic evidence in the 
investigation of cybercrime.  
 
3.3.2. Search and Seizure provisions and its challenges 
 
(a) Search warrants 
 
General searches and seizures are carried out under the authority of a warrant as 
prescribed by section 21 of the CPA.151 Section 21 of the CPA sets out that articles 
can be seized by virtue of a lawful search warrant which requires police officials to 
seize the article in question and further authorises the police official to search any 
person or premises or any person found on the premises identified in the warrant.  
 
                                            
146 OS Kerr 'Search warrants in an era of digital evidence: Symposium: the search and seizure of 
computers and electronic evidence' (2005) 75 Mississippi L J 85–138. 
147 S v Miller & others 2016 (1) SACR 251 (WCC). 
148 Ibid. See also South African Law Commission Discussion Paper 99 (note 87 above) and DP Van der 
Merwe… et al (note 12 above, 77). 
149 GP Bouwer (note 31 above, 169). 
150 This is discussed in paragraph 2.2.2 (c) of this Chapter.  
151 A Nieman (note 100 above, 159). 
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The CPA specifically provides for the search by means of a warrant.152 The following 
information must be included in a valid search warrant to enable a proper search: 
identify the searcher; identify the container, premises or person to be searched; 
describe, with sufficient particularity, the article to be searched for and seized; and the 
offence that triggered the criminal investigation.153 This statute provides that an article 
may only be seized by virtue of a search warrant whereby the person and/or premises 
to be searched are identified in the search warrant.154  
 
It is submitted that currently the second search is conducted by a different searcher 
and at a different location which details are not set out in the warrant.155 The second 
search, therefore, does not fall within the ambit of the initial warrant granted.  
 
The constitutional court set out that vagueness or over breadth in search warrants can 
be dispelled by defining the scope of the search and confining the actual search and 
seizure to those articles and premises that are set out in the warrant as having a 
bearing on the investigation.156 This practice of not having a broad and general warrant 
acts as a safeguard against criticism of the warrant.157 
 
By way of illustration, in the case of Zoeco System Managers CC v Minister of Safety 
and Security N.O. the applicant sought to set aside a warrant whereby its computer 
equipment and other electronic devices were seized.158  Its application was 
successful, one of the grounds being that the articles to be seized were not described 
with sufficient particularity therefore the applicants were unable to decipher which 
articles were susceptible to being searched and seized.159  
 
Further, in the case of Powell N.O v Van der Merwe N.O160 the court held that phrases 
used in the warrant, such as “all documents” and “any other document and/or object 
that has relevance to or may have relevance to the investigation”, provided vague 
                                            
152 Section 21 of the CPA. 
153 A Le Roux-Kemp ‘Criminal Procedure’ (2011) Annual Survey of South African Law. 
154 Section 21 of the CPA. 
155 GP Bouwer (note 31 above, 156). 
156  Minister of Safety and Security v Van der Merwe and Others 2011 (2) SACR 301 (CC). 
157 Ibid. V Basdeo (note 45 above, 168). 
158 Zoeco System Managers CC v Minister of Safety and Security No and Others 2013 (2) SACR 545 
(GNP). 
159 Ibid. 
160 2005 (1) SACR 317 (SCA). 
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guidance as to what can or cannot be seized. The warrant was accordingly set 
aside.161 
 
Courts apply a ‘principle of strict interpretation’ when dealing with search warrants as 
portrayed in the Beheermaatschappij Helling I NV case162 where the court held that 
only the search and seizure of ‘documentation’ was authorised by the warrants in 
question and electronic equipment such as CPU’s fell outside the ambit of this 
warrant.163  However this principle was not always applied as seen in the case of 
Seccombe164 where the court described a ‘document’ as a broad term which can 
include everything consisting written or pictorial proof irrespective of the material that 
it is made of, thus including electronic information.165 Further, a document can 
encompass invisible images on tapes, films, videotapes, flash drives, computer discs 
or other devices.166 
 
Another point to mention is that in instances where the police seize items that are not 
listed in the search warrant and go beyond the scope of the warrant, the court is not 
quick to render such a search and seizure as unlawful but prefers to remedy the 
situation by ordering the return of the items.167  
 
This inconsistency depicts a clear legal uncertainty in the interpretation and application 
of these search and seizure provisions. It is submitted that the lack of particularity in 
describing the electronic evidence to be seized poses a challenge in the investigation 
of a cybercrime being in accordance with a search warrant.  
 
(b) Search of premises 
 
In terms of search and seizure the CPA defines ‘premises’ as ‘including land, any 
building or structure, or any vehicle, conveyance ship, boat or aircraft’.168 Bouwer 
                                            
161 Ibid. See also GP Bouwer (note 31 above, 167). 
162 Beheermaatschappij Helling I NV v Magistrate, Cape Town 2007 (1) SACR 99 (C). 
163 M Cowling ‘Criminal Procedure’ 2007 South African Journal of Criminal Justice 351. 
164 Seccombe v. Attorney-General 2002 (2) All SA 185.  
165 M Watney (note 39 above, 5). 
166 DS De Villiers ‘Old “documents”, “videotapes” and new “data messages” – a functional approach to 
the law of evidence (part 1) (2010) 3 TSAR 564. 
167 Polonyfis v The Minister of Police (64/2010) [2011] ZASCA 26. 
168 Section 1 of the CPA. 
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argues that the search of a computer falls outside the ambit of this definition.169 The 
South African Law Commission is of same view in that a physical computer may be 
seized under the provisions of the CPA however the uncertainty lies with obtaining a 
warrant to search for and seize any electronic evidence contained on the computer.170 
To overcome the above uncertainty in searching for items that are intangible in nature, 
s 82(4) of the ECT Act provides that the concept of “premises” as referred to by the 
CPA includes information systems resulting in the inclusion of electronic evidence. The 
ECT Act defines information systems as ‘a system for generating, sending, receiving, 
storing, displaying or otherwise processing data messages and includes the 
Internet.171 
 
Our court is of the view that the premises should be intelligibly described in the warrant 
meaning that those officials who are conducting the search are able to identify the 
premises.172  An incorrect description of the premises does not render the warrant 
invalid where sufficient particularity is used when describing the premises.173  In the 
writer’s view, should a search of a computer or similar electronic equipment be 
required then the warrant should state the premises as an information system as 
provided by the ECT Act.  However, this opinion is in need of judicial scrutiny as well 
as input from other experts in the field.    
 
(c) Bouwer’s two-step process174 
 
Bouwer’s two-step process regarding the search and seizure of electronic evidence 
involves: 
 Firstly, searching of a physical environment and seizing of tangible objects. 
This entails police officials entering the physical premises that is subject to the 
                                            
169 GP Bouwer (note 31 above, 158). 
170 South African Law Commission Discussion Paper 99 (Project 108) (note 87 above). 
171 Section 1 of the ECT Act. 
172 Polonyfis v The Minister of Police (note 163 above). 
173 Ibid. 
174 Gideon Bouwer is an experienced policeman and advocate of the High Court who specialises in 
information technology law.  He has the practical experience of enforcing the law as well as the 
knowledge of legislative instruments. M Saville ‘Cop becomes advocate’ news24 archives 2006 
available at http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Cop-becomes-advocate-20060424, accessed 
on 27 August 2017.  G Bouwer ‘ICT policy proposals spell out an attempt to nationalise assets’ Business 
Day 2017 available at https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/opinion/2017-03-13-ict-policy-proposals-spell-
out-an-attempt-to-nationalise-assets/, accessed on 27 August 2017. 
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search and thereafter searching for and seizing the electronic devices 
(computer hardware and the like); and  
 Secondly the searching of seized electronic devices and the seizure of 
electronic evidence found on those devices. This involves removing the 
electronic devices from the searched premises and thereafter, at a later stage, 
searching the electronic device and seizing the electronic evidence located 
therein.175   
 
Consequently, these seizures occur at different times and in different places and are 
performed by different individuals.176 However, currently it is viewed as a single 
process which means that should the search and seizure of the physical equipment be 
unlawful then the search and seizure of the electronic evidence will follow suit.177 In 
previous cases involving electronic evidence, only a single warrant was issued which 
made references to using forensic analysis to conduct searches “at a location removed 
from the premises.”178  In light of the above, it is submitted that police officials have 
two options namely the application for a second warrant or the application of a single 
warrant that sets out both search and seizure procedures with sufficient detail and 
particularity to be able to differentiate between the two different procedures.  
  
In the context of electronic evidence, the second step extended the ability to access 
the contents of the articles that were seized.179 At times it can be argued that the police 
do not have the requisite authority that a cyber inspector180 has to access information 
contained on seized items therefore the conduct of the police could result in a 
contravention of s86(1) of the ECT Act being unauthorised access to data.181  
 
In the writer’s view, the implementation of the two-step process will break ground in 
the search and seizure of electronic evidence by being procedurally correct and 
minimising the risk of technicalities being raised in defence. However, the second step 
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176 Ibid.  
177 Ibid. See also Cadac (Pty) Ltd v Weber-Stephen Products Co 2011 (3) SA 570 (SCA) at para [18]. 
178 Thint (Pty) Ltd v National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others; Zuma v National Director of 
Public Prosecutions and Others 2008 (2) SACR 421 (CC) at para [19]. See also Van der Merwe v 
Additional Magistrate, Cape Town; 2010 (1) SACR 470 (C) at para [121]. 
179 E Du Toit (note 64 above, 13). 
180 As mentioned in Chapter 1 and will be further explored within this chapter. 
181 E Du Toit (note 64 above, 13). 
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could result in a constitutional challenge where the owner of electronic equipment is 
deprived of possession while the police carry out the search for electronic evidence.182  
 
3.4. Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002 
 
3.4.1. Introduction  
 
In South Africa, in the context of electronic evidence, civil proceedings were regulated 
by the Civil Proceedings Evidence Act183 and the Computer Evidence Act (CEA).184  
One of the primary academic criticisms levelled against the CEA is that it did not apply 
to criminal matters and therefore left the regulation of electronic evidence with a 
lacuna.185 
 
Consequently, criminal proceedings were left with no direction, other than the common 
law186, until 30 August 2002 when the ECT Act came into operation.187 Prior to the 
ECT Act, the CPA was the only legal instrument that governed electronic evidence in 
criminal matters through sections 221 and 222.188 The ECT Act is a mechanism that 
government used to establish a structure to regulate and define e-commerce in South 
Africa.189  
 
However, this not does mean that all other laws are no longer applicable as Section 3 
of the ECT Act states: 
‘This Act must not be interpreted so as to exclude any statutory law or common law from being 
applied to, recognising or accommodating electronic transactions, data messages or any other 
matter provided for in this Act.’190 
                                            
182 Beheermaatschappij Helling I NV v Magistrate, Cape Town (note 158 above). 
183 Act 25 of 1965 
184 Act 32 of 1985. The requirements of this Act were overly technical in nature resulting in difficulty in 
compliance.  The Act was accordingly repealed by the ECT Act and this repeal was welcomed.  PJ 
Schwikkard and Van der Merwe (note 43 above, 439). 
185 DP Van der Merwe … et al (note 12 above, 110). 
186 As explained in paragraph 3.2 above. 
187 M Watney (note 39 above, 3). 
188 DP Van der Merwe … et al (note 12 above, 110). Section 221 deals with the admissibility of certain 
business or trade records and section 222 states that the Civil Proceedings Evidence Act applies mutatis 
mutandis to criminal proceedings. 
189 S Sissing and J Prinsloo ‘Contextualising the phenomenon of cyber stalking and protection from 
harassment in South Africa’ (2013)26(2) Acta Criminologica: Southern African Journal of Criminology 
23. 
190 Section 3 of the ECT Act. 
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The ECT Act aims to bring about legal certainty regarding electronic communications 
and transactions191 and satisfied the obligation which the Cybercrime Convention 
imposed on its member states to criminalise certain types of electronic conduct. 192  
 
In aid of bringing the CPA into the virtual realm, the ECT Act provides clarity to the 
terms ‘premises’ and ‘article’ used in the CPA by stating that these terms include 
information systems and data messages.193  It therefore makes the CPA applicable to 
the search and seizure of electronic evidence. 
In the investigation of the cybercrimes created by the ECT Act194 the following 
evidence will be encountered: computer systems comprising of hard drives, 
keyboards, monitors, laptops, servers; traditional telephone systems, the internet, 
wireless telecommunication systems; embedded computer systems which include 
mobile devices, navigation systems, smart cards, sensing and diagnostic modules, 
amongst others.195   
 
3.4.2. Issues with the search and seizure provisions of the ECT Act.  
  
Firstly, cyber policing was created by the ECT Act by means of introducing the role of 
a cyber inspector who was meant to be an employee of the Department of 
Communications.196  The Act empowers cyber inspectors to search (enter any 
premises) and seize (access information) that may have an impact on the investigation 
into cybercrime197 and further permits the SAPS to call upon the cyber inspector for 
help in the investigation of a cybercrime.198 
 
                                            
191 Section 2(e) of the ECT Act. 
192 DP Van der Merwe Computers and the Law 2ed 2000 67. 
193 S Papadopoulos et al. (note 7 above, 328).  
194 Section 86 and Section 87.  
195 E Casey Digital Evidence and Computer Crime: Forensic Science, Computers and the Internet 3 ed 
(2011) 8. 
196 SL Gereda ‘The Electronic Communications and Transactions Act’ 2006 Telecommunications Law 
in South Africa 281. 
197 F Cassim ‘Formulating specialised legislation to address the growing spectre of cybercrime: a 
comparative study’ 2009 (12) PER 59. 
198 Section 81 (2) of the ECT Act. 
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The challenge that has been identified in this research is that the ECT Act created the 
role of a cyber inspector yet none have been appointed.199  Juxtaposed to chapter 2 
of the CPA, s82 of the ECT Act provides a far more detailed account of what the search 
and seizure of electronic evidence should entail by providing cyber inspectors with 
these specific powers.  
 
The ECT Act further enables cyber inspectors with more technical search and seizure 
procedures by affording them the power to monitor and investigate the conduct and 
activities of a cryptography service provider200 and an authentication service 
provider201 and perform an audit on a critical database administrator.202  
 
The current position with regard to this detailed procedure is that it is futile in the sense 
that no person has been appointed in the capacity of a cyber inspector who would 
have the skills to carry out these procedures. However, the Act falls short in not 
specifying the type of qualification a cyber inspector should possess but instead 
assigns the onus of appointing a cyber inspector to the director-general of the 
Department of Communications.203 
 
Van der Merwe is of the view that even though the ECT Act aimed to bring new 
developments to the field of investigation into technology and cybercrime, it did not 
follow through in practical application as no cyber inspectors were appointed.204 In the 
writer’s view, cyber inspectors were expected to be experts in this specialised field of 
ICT forensics with their role created to have elevated investigative procedures.   
 
It is submitted that the disadvantage that South Africa has in this regard is that as a 
result of no cyber inspectors being appointed, the SAPS had no opportunity to seek 
advanced assistance in the search and seizure of electronic evidence. The SAPS is 
tasked to investigate cybercrime using the provisions of the CPA which was not 
                                            
199 S v Miller [2015] 4 All SA 503 (WCC) at para 56. See also S Papadopoulos et al. (note 7 above, 
328). 
200 Section 81 (1) (b) of the ECT Act. 
201 Section 81 (1) (c) of the ECT Act. 
202 Section 81 (1) (d) of the ECT Act. 
203 SL Gereda (note 195 above, 281).  
204 DP Van der Merwe… et al (note 12 above, 86).  
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created to be exercised in the virtual realm without having the status of a cyber 
inspector and practically applying the below provisions of the ECT Act.205  
 
Firstly, cyber inspectors are empowered to:  
 Search premises or information systems;206 
 Search any person on those premises on a reasonable belief that such person 
is in possession of evidence that can be used in the investigation;207 
 Inspect facilities on the premises linked or associated with the information 
system that have a bearing on the investigation;208 and  
 ‘have access to and inspect the operation of any computer forming part of an 
information system and any associated apparatus or material which the cyber 
inspector has reasonable cause to suspect is or has been used in connection 
with any offence.’209 
 
As seen above these provisions are more technical in nature and cater for the 
electronic environment. These specialised procedures were never implemented nor 
practiced.  
 
Secondly, the ECT Act makes provision for cyber inspectors to request a warrant in 
the investigation of a crime.210 Such warrant permits their entry into premises and the 
access of information systems and enables the carrying out of necessary searches in 
accordance with the provisions set out the ECT Act.211  The ECT Act warrant differs 
from the CPA warrant in that it does not make reference to a peace officer and the 
warrant must specify ‘the premises or information system’ that search and seizure 
applied to.212 Here, the inclusion of ‘information system’ remedied the uncertainty 
surrounding whether it was included in the term ‘premises’ as set out by the CPA.  
 
                                            
205 V Basdeo ‘A constitutional perspective of police powers of search and seizure in the criminal justice 
system’ (unpublished LLM Thesis, University of South Africa, 2009, 139). 
206 Section 81 (1) (a) of the ECT Act. 
207 Section 81 (1) (b) of the ECT Act. 
208 Section 81 (1) (e) of the ECT Act. 
209 Section 81 (1) (f) of the ECT Act. 
210 Section 83 of the ECT Act. 
211 DP Van der Merwe… et al (note 12 above, 86). 
212 Section 83 (3) (a) of the ECT Act. See also V Basdeo (note 65 above, 207). 
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Thirdly, the legislature through s82 (1) (f) gave authority to cyber inspectors to carry 
out a search and seizure even if such activity is not stated in the warrant by making 
reference to ‘any offence’.213  This could apply in a situation where a cyber inspector 
may whilst executing a search in terms of a warrant, formulates a reasonable suspicion 
that computer equipment present on the premises has been or is being used in the 
commission of another offence.214 
 
Another difference between the search and seizure provisions of the CPA and the ECT 
Act is that the ECT Act makes provision for the taking of extracts from or making copies 
of books, documents, records or information systems; accessing and inspecting the 
operation of any computer or information system related equipment or any associated 
apparatus that a cyber inspector reasonably suspects is involved in the commission of 
a crime.215   
 
It is submitted that these provisions are technology driven and requires insight into this 
field in order to carry out procedures such as being able to identify items that could be 
used in the commission of a crime. Further the evidential weight allocated to a data 
message, for instance, is dependent on factors which include ‘the reliability of the 
manner in which the integrity of the data message was maintained.’216 Therefore it is 
submitted that the validity of search and seizure procedures of electronic evidence is 
of utmost importance in prosecution to avoid vital evidence being rendered 
inadmissible in court. 
 
Lastly, in terms of s82 (2) ‘a person who refuses to co-operate or hinders a person 
conducting a lawful search and seizure in terms of this section is guilty of an offence’.  
This provision is said to be ambiguous in that it does not explain what constitutes 
hindering or refusing to co-operate.217 It is argued that these provisions are inflexible 
and deficient lacking the attention to privacy and other constitutional concerns as well 
as the seizure of electronic documents.218   
 
                                            
213 V Basdeo (note 65 above, 207). 
214 Ibid. 
215 Section 82 of the ECT Act and DP Van der Merwe… et al (note 12 above, 86). 
216 S15 (3) of the ECT Act and A Bellengere et al… (note 87 above, 76). 
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Another view is that this section was aimed at instances where the information system 
is password-protected and accordingly the access is denied.219   Here the cyber 
inspector is empowered by this provision to compel a suspect to co-operate by 
providing the password and hence making the data on the information system 
available to the cyber inspector.220 
 
Another prominent challenge that presents itself is that of jurisdiction whereby 
electronic evidence can be stored on or transmitted from electronic devices outside 
South Africa territory.221 In this regard the need for international cooperation and 
mutual assistance arises.222 
 
In light of the above, the current legal position regarding the ECT Act, in the opinion of 
the writer, is inadequate.  In summary, the reasons for the inadequacy is that even 
though this law is geared towards electronic evidence and devices, the cyber 
inspectorate which should have the authority to rule in the cyber realm has not 
materialised.  This has left the investigative provisions of the ECT Act dormant and 
ineffective.   
4. Conclusion 
 
Both the ECT Act and the CPA are unable to accurately and effectively deal with or 
regulate the cyber environment and the current types and levels of cybercrime.223  This 
is as a result of the ECT Act’s cyber inspectorate not materialising and the lack of cyber 
specific procedures catered for in the CPA. It is however, acknowledged that the CPA 
is currently being applied to the search and seizure of electronic evidence. However, 
the lack of successful prosecutions imply that the provisions of the CPA are not 
adequately equipped to deal with the nature of cyberspace.  
 
Therefore there is a need to review and update the necessary legislation to adequately 
deal with the ever-changing nature of technology.224  It is imperative to take into 
                                            
219 DP Van der Merwe… et al (note 12 above, 86). 
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account international best practice and the future Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill 
to make an adequate assessment of the position of South Africa in the investigation of 
cybercrime.  
 
It is vital that any law enforcement agency, that aim to successfully deal with 
cybercrime, possesses a basic knowledge and understanding of cyberspace in light of 
the intricateness and complexity of its nature.225  In 2014 the Head of the Electronic 
Crime Unit at the SAPS said ‘there is still a widespread ignorance amongst law 
enforcement officials in the gathering of digital evidence’ and emphasised the need for 
specialised upskilling to ‘search, seize, secure (acquisition) and protect the evidential 
integrity of digital evidence.’226  
 
It is submitted that South Africa cannot effectively address the problem of cybercrime 
as it lacks the necessary legal procedures and/or legal tools.227 However, in the 
absence of cyber inspectors, it is submitted that the investigation of cybercrime should 
not suffer at the worst degree as the SAPS (undergoing the training mentioned above) 
and various cybersecurity experts in the business sector have the capability to apply 
electronic forensic principles in the search and seizure process.228 
 
Furthermore, there is a growing need for cybercrime specific legislation to overcome 
the technical difficulties experienced and to provide for the use of electronic evidence 
in criminal cases229 and research to be done in a more extensive and in-depth manner 
on every aspect of cybercrime to aid investigation and prosecution of cyber 
criminals.230 It is still to be determined whether the Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity 
Bill231 will bring such legislative relief.  
 
                                            
225 A Minnaar ‘How organised is cybercrime and can it be called organised crime per se?’ (2015) 3 (28) 
Acta Criminologica: Southern African Journal of Criminology ii. 
226 L Mashiloane ‘Piet Pieterse: SAPS intensifies cyber crime battle’ 2014 available at 
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August 2017. 
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228J Hofman (note 179 above, 257). 
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230 A Minnaar (note 224 above. v). 
231 The Bill is discussed in further detail in Chapter 3 of this dissertation.  
37 
 
 
CHAPTER THREE - THE CYBERCRIMES AND CYBERSECURITY BILL 
1. Introduction and Development of the Bill 
 
On 1 March 2015, South Africa held a Cybersecurity Symposium in which the 
government acknowledged and addressed the threat that cybercrime poses to South 
Africa.232  The Minister of State Security in his speech at the symposium alluded to the 
fact that the implementation of the ECT Act improved South Africa’s legal system to 
deal with cyber threats.233  In closing his address the Minister positioned the 
development of a draft Bill by the Department of Justice and Constitutional 
Development and further encouraged industry and the public to engage and provide 
input into its development.234 
 
In August 2015 the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development invited 
comments on the Draft Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill.235  This 2015 version of 
the Bill aimed to inter alia, create offences, prescribe penalties and further regulate the 
powers to investigate, search and gain access to or seize items.236  One of the 
criticisms that the 2015 version of the Bill faced was that the definition of “investigator” 
was too broad and allowed individuals to be appointed that did not have the obligation 
to adhere to the constitutional and legislative provisions that governed the members 
of security services.237 
 
After the consideration of all comments received, the Department of Justice and 
Constitutional Development published a notice in the Government Gazette introducing 
                                            
232 D Mahlobo MP, Minister of State Security ‘Remarks on Cybersecurity Symposium’ 1 March 2015 
available at http://www.gov.za/speeches/minister-david-mahlobo-cybersecurity-symposium-1-mar-
2015-0000, accessed on 5 April 2017. 
233 Ibid. 
234 Ibid. 
235 Department of Justice and Constitutional Development ‘Cybercrimes Bill Released for Comment’ 
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236 Ibid. 
237 Adv J Kruger ‘Concise Submission on the Draft Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill [B-2015]’ 26 
November 2015 available at https://www.ellipsis.co.za/wp-
content/uploads/2015/11/151126_cfcr_submission_on_cybercrimes_and_cybersecurity_bill.pdf, 
accessed on 30 September 2017. 
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the Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill, 2017.238  The current 2017 version is said to 
be better thought through than its predecessors.239  
 
The Bill is viewed as an impetus driving a higher level of cyber security awareness in 
the business industry and within the government.240  It has the potential to build and 
stimulate a vigorous cyber security stance in South Africa however the delays in 
enacting the legislation is seen as a hampering these efforts.241 
 
This chapter aims to review the Bill in light of search and seizure of electronic evidence 
by commenting on whether it will amend the current position242 and bringing to light 
any deficiencies that may still exist.  
2. Comparison of the Search and seizure provisions set out in the Bill to the 
current legal position  
 
Chapter 5 of the Bill sets out the powers to investigate, search and access or seize.  
This paper will focus on those provisions that attempt to change the current legal 
position governing search and seizure of electronic evidence. The Bill sets out that the 
provisions of the CPA apply in addition to the Bill, provided that the CPA is not 
inconsistent with the provisions of the Bill, in which event, the Bill prevails.243 Therefore 
the provisions of the Bill and the CPA apply jointly to the search and seizure of 
electronic evidence.  
 
2.1 Definitions 
 
The definitions of search and seizure, as set out in the Bill, bring South African cyber-
related legislation into alignment with technological developments.  The proposed 
                                            
238 GN 871 of GG 40487, 9/12/2016; 4. 
239 L Pierce ‘Cybercrimes Bill – much better in 2017’ IT – Online available at https://it-
online.co.za/2017/01/25/cybercrimes-bill-much-better-in-2017/, accessed on 3 June 2017. 
240 K Doyle ‘Data breaches remain unreported by SA organisation’ 15 March 2017 ITWeb Security 
available at http://www.itweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=160221:Data-
breaches-remain-unreported-by-SA-organisations&catid=234, accessed on 16 September 2017. 
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definitions now include databases, devices and computer networks - these concepts 
are central to the search and seizure of electronic evidence.244  
 
This adds to and amplifies the current legal position of the CPA which did not expressly 
specify that its application extended to cyberspace.245 The impact of this change is that 
it brings about legal certainty by providing for specific definitions that are involved in 
the search and seizure of electronic evidence.  
 
In comparison to the ECT Act, the concept of electronic evidence was limited to the 
terms “data’ and “data message” however it broadened the term premises used in the 
CPA to include information systems.246 The Bill expands on the foundation set by the 
ECT ACT by detailing different types of electronic devices and mediums such as 
programmes, systems, and storage mediums as depicted below.  
 
With specific regard to search and seizure of electronic evidence the Bill now 
introduces the term “access” which is defined as: 
for purposes of Chapter 5, includes without limitation to make use of data, a computer program, 
a computer data storage medium or a computer system or their accessories or components or 
any part thereof or any ancillary device or component to the extent necessary to search for and 
seize an article. 
 
One of the salient new features of the Bill in relation to the investigation of electronic 
evidence is that the concept “seize” is now defined as including the following: 
(a) remove a computer data storage medium or any part of a computer system;  
(b) render inaccessible data, a computer program, a computer data storage medium   or any 
part of a computer system in order to preserve evidence;  
(c) make and retain a copy of data or a computer program; or  
(d) make and retain a printout of output of data or a computer program.247 
 
Further to the definition of “seize” the Bill defines an “article” as: 
any data, computer program, computer data storage medium, or computer system which—  
                                            
244 M Musoni (note 232 above, 689). 
245 Ibid.  
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(a) is concerned with, connected with or is, on reasonable grounds, believed to be concerned 
with or connected with the commission or suspected commission;  
(b) may afford evidence of the commission or suspected commission; or  
(c) is intended to be used or is, on reasonable grounds, believed to be intended to be used in 
the commission,  
of an offence in terms of Chapter 2 or section 16, 17 or 18 of the Act or any other offence which 
may be committed by means of or facilitated through, the use of such an article, whether within 
the Republic or elsewhere. 
 
However, the Bill sets out that the CPA still applies together with the provisions set out 
in the Bill as long as they do not contradict each other.248 The impact of introducing 
definitions that cater for electronic devices, in addition to providing consistency and 
clarity to the existing legal position, is that it educates police officials with the 
knowledge that there are different types of electronic devices which have the capacity 
to create and store data in electronic form, and such data may constitute evidential 
material.249  It further equips attorneys to be aware that there are various electronic 
devices that electronic evidence can be retrieved from and advise their clients on 
investigation, admissibility, disclosure and treatment of electronic evidence.250 These 
examples show that the promulgation of the Bill will bring about a greater sense of 
awareness and competency in those that deal with challenges involving technology. 
 
It is submitted that the Bill does not necessarily change the existing regulations of the 
CPA but brings about much needed cyber specific provisions and legislation that 
directly address the search and seizure of electronic evidence.  In this regard, should 
the Bill be promulgated, it would result in South Africa taking a step forward in aligning 
with the advancement of technology. Further, it is anticipated that law enforcement 
and prosecution will be equipped to secure not only cybercrime convictions but also 
be able to gather data that can serve as evidence in the prosecution of other crimes 
and aid in legal matters.  
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2.2. Standard Operating Procedures251 
 
Chapter 5 of the Bill starts with an introduction into standard operating procedures 
being developed that must be observed by the SAPS or any other authorised 
investigator when carrying out any investigation in relation to the offences set out by 
the Bill.252 The standard operating procedures should be issued within six months of 
the commencement of this Chapter.253 The standard operating procedure becomes 
operative when the relevant authority in the Department that is responsible for 
authorising it signs the document.254  
The standard operating procedures will be of great benefit in the search and seizure 
of electronic evidence in that it will standardise the activities that occur in an 
investigation, it will set out the expectations of the applicable personnel and it can 
serve as a framework for training.255 The standard operating procedures sets the Bill 
apart from the current legal position as it provides for a set of written instructions that 
will inform the routine or activities that the SAPS will engage in when conducting an 
investigation.256   
 
It is evident that the drafting of the Bill was influenced by the Cybercrime Convention, 
in that the Cybercrime Convention provides that “legislative and other measures as 
may be necessary to establish the powers and procedures provided for in this section 
for the purpose of specific criminal investigations or proceedings.”257  It is submitted 
that the standard operating procedures speak to the specific criminal investigations 
mentioned in the Cybercrime Convention. 
 
                                            
251 Standard Operating Procedures “is a specific procedure or set of procedures established to be 
followed in carrying out a given operation or in a given situation to enhance quality through following a 
standardardised work procedure.” The Department: Public Service and Administration ‘Toolkit on 
Standard Operating Procedures’ available at 
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D%20OPERATING%20PROCEDURES%20march%202013.pdf, accessed on 28 September 2017. 
252 Section 24 of the Bill. 
253 Section 24 of the Bill. 
254 The Department: Public Service and Administration ‘Toolkit on Standard Operating Procedures’ See 
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As the investigation of electronic evidence is a developing field, it is recommended that 
a framework of standards governing the process of search and seizure of electronic 
evidence be prioritised and drafted.258 The legislature took this approach when law 
enforcement was confronted with the collection of other evidence that required forensic 
analysis such as DNA. To this end the Criminal Law (Forensic Procedures) Act259 
together with its corresponding regulations260 were enacted as provision for DNA 
customised guidelines. In the same light electronic evidence specific guidelines should 
be established. South Africa can draw guidance and insight from international 
institutions such as, inter alia, INTERPOL and the International Organisation on 
Computer Evidence, when drafting these Standard Operating Procedures.261 
 
The drafting of Standard Operating Procedures has been delegated to knowledgeable 
individuals that are essentially subject matter experts in the field and actually carry out 
the duties and related procedures.262 Currently, there appears to be Interim Standing 
Operating Procedures Dealing with Electronic Evidence and a Practical Guide to Apply 
for Search Warrants in terms of the Provisions of Section 21 of the Criminal Procedure 
Act which will aid the formalisation of a final standard operating procedure.263 It is 
reported that the Interim Standing Operating Procedures define electronic devices, 
provide for digital forensic investigators and specificity in a warrant of whether or not 
copies of data will be made on-site or off-site.264 
 
This may result in the drafting of the final standard operating procedures occurring 
sooner rather than later. However, it is hoped that this can be accomplished within the 
designated six month period with due regards to the technical nature of electronic 
evidence, the lack of expert human resources that are currently operating in this field 
and the due process of reviewing and approval of the standard operating procedures. 
                                            
258 S Mason Electronic Evidence 3ed (2012) 73. 
259 Act 37 of 2013. 
260 Forensic DNA Regulations, 2015. Government Gazette No. R. 207. 13 March 2015. 
261 Expanded on in Chapter 4 of this paper. 
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The full effect of the (search and seizure provisions) Bill will not be realised until such 
time that the standard operating procedures are put in place.  
 
2.3. Cyber inspector vs police official   
 
As detailed in the previous chapter, one of the main inadequacies of the current legal 
position is the lack of manifestation of the cyber inspector. The most glaring and 
obvious difference between the Bill and the current legal position is that the Bill does 
not mention or cater for the cyber inspector.  It is submitted that this is possibly due to 
a cyber inspector not ever materialising.265  
 
In the fifteen years that the ECT Act has been effective, the SAPS attempted to carry 
out the functions that were specifically created for the cyber inspector. As a result, the 
Bill now moves away from creating a new ideal persona to reign over search and 
seizure of electronic evidence and adds this role to the already existing search and 
seizure powers of the police.  
 
The Bill now refers to police officials making written application for a search warrant 
and being identified in the warrant whereas the ECT Act provided for cyber 
inspectors.266 In addition to a police official, an investigator or any other person may 
be required to assist the police official by the warrant.267  An investigator, is defined in 
the Bill as: 
any person, who is not a member of the South African Police Service and who is—  
(a) identified and authorised in terms of a search warrant contemplated in section 27(3); or  
(b) requested by a police official in terms of section 30(3) or 31(4), 12 to, subject to the direction 
and control of the police official, assist a police official with the search for, access or seizure of 
an article.268 
 
In the writer’s view the police official is now tasked with solely conducting the search 
and seizure of electronic evidence without the option of requesting assistance from a 
                                            
265 As discussed in Chapter 2. 
266 Section 26 and Section 27(1) of the Bill. 
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cyber inspector.  The Bill’s consequent omission of the role of cyber inspector and 
providing for the generality of an investigator avoids limiting the scope of its application 
to only a certain role as the ECT Act did.  Therefore, it is submitted that this a positive 
step in changing the current position. The reason is that currently police officials are 
carrying out search and seizure of electronic evidence in the investigation of crime 
therefore the Bill now enhances their existing powers to perform cyber specific 
procedures independently. The implication, however, is that police officials require 
specialised training to apply the provisions of the Act.  
 
Further structures that the Bill provides for with regard to assistance in investigation of 
cybercrime is the 24/7 Point of Contact and the Cyber Response Committee. The 
creation of the 24/7 Point of Contact as envisaged by the Bill is inspired by the 
Cybercrime Convention269 setting out its features to include operating twenty-four 
hours a day and seven days a week.270  The objective of this organisation is to ensure 
that assistance is available with regard to proceedings or investigations of any offence 
as set out in the Bill.271   
 
The type of assistance that can be expected from the 24/7 Point of Contact consists 
of technical advice, legal assistance, identification and location of an article and/or 
suspect and cooperation with authorities in foreign jurisdictions.272 In addition, all 
requests for assistance and cooperation from foreign states must go through the 24/7 
Point of Contact who will then submit said request to the NDPP273 for consideration.274 
 
The Cyber Response Committee is established by the Bill with the object of 
implementing cybersecurity policies created by Government.275 The centralisation and 
                                            
269 MA Vatis ‘The Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime’ (2010) Proceedings of a workshop on 
deterring cyberattacks 217. 
270 Section 50 (3) (a) of the Bill. 
271 Ibid. 
272 Section 50 (3) (b) of the Bill. 
273 National Director of Public Prosecutions. 
274 Section 46(1) and (2) of the Bill. 
275 Section 53 (1) and (5) of the Bill. 
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proper coordination of these two bodies will ensure effective investigation and regulate 
cybercrimes.276 
 
Currently, South Africa has a Cybersecurity Hub277  that took 3 years to establish and 
an initiative known as the Cybercrime.org.za.278 It is submitted that the 24/7 Point of 
Contact and Cyber Response Committee will be established albeit in the far future. In 
my view, this is as a result of the lack of both human and financial resources to set up 
and staff these centres.   
 
The opinion of the Director of Centre for Cyber Security situated at the University of 
Johannesburg is that South Africa does not have the capacity for effective 
cybersecurity.279  Inasmuch as the Bill provides good ideas and structures to deal with 
cybercrime, there is doubt as to whether South Africa actually have the people and/or 
resources to implement it.280 
 
2.4. Specialised Training 
 
The investigation of cybercrime can be a lengthy process and therefore requires a 
significant allocation of resources.281 In addition to monetary resources required to 
track suspects, trained investigators that are skilled and educated in cybercrime are 
also required.282  Cybercrime investigators must be equipped not only to collect 
electronic evidence but also analyse said evidence and be able to communicate it 
before a court of law.283 The reality is that specially trained cybercrime investigators 
are far and few resulting in the lack of investigations and prosecutions.284 
 
                                            
276 M Musoni (note 232 above, 687).  
277 DP Van der Merwe et al (note 12 above, 66). 
278 Cybercrime.org.za available at http://cybercrime.org.za/, accessed on 1 October 2017. 
279 E Goff ‘SA doesn’t have the people to fight cybercrime, warns expert’ 23 May 2017 IOL available at 
http://www.iol.co.za/business-report/companies/sa-doesnt-have-the-people-to-fight-cybercrime-warns-
expert-9300956, accessed on 1 August 2017. 
280 Ibid. 
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Further to these structures, it is necessary that law enforcement agencies are 
sufficiently equipped to make use of investigative tools and possess knowledge on the 
nuances of the law to avoid investigations being hindered and jeopardise the fairness 
of a trial.285 One of the investigative tools is computer forensics which entails the 
examination of various computer components such as external drives, printers, hard 
drives; and the examination of electronic evidence such as data traffic, and stored 
data.286 
 
The investigation of an alleged cybercrime scene requires specialised knowledge and 
expertise.287 South Africa acknowledging the threat of cybercrime requested 
assistance from the Council of Europe in the form of improving capacity by the 
implementation of legislation.288  Thus the judiciary have already received cybercrime 
specific training equipping them to effectively apply cyber principles to the matters they 
preside over.289 It is expected that law enforcement agencies would receive further 
training that will equip them with necessary cybercrime related information.290   
 
The future establishment of the specialised organisations such as the 24/7 Point of 
Contact and the Cybersecurity Response Committee requires its members to undergo 
training extensively in the field of cybercrime in order to effectively carry out their 
functions. According to the Bill, prosecutors who possess the required knowledge and 
skills to address any aspect relating to the Act must be available to provide legal 
assistance when necessary or expedient to the 24/7 Point of Contact.291 It is submitted 
that as technology advances continuously, ongoing training should be completed by 
all stakeholders involved in and affected by the cyber related matters. These include 
law enforcement, legal professionals, judicial officers, court officials and interpreters.  
 
                                            
285 V Basdeo (note 205 above, 7). 
286 Hill and Marion (note 10 above, 13).  
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288 G Makhafola ‘Training to help SA tackle cyber crime’ 11 April 2016 available at 
http://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/training-to-help-sa-tackle-cyber-crime-2007868, accessed on 
22 June 2016. 
289 Ibid.  
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2.5. Search warrants in terms of Bill 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter,292 a valid warrant sets out with sufficient 
particularity the details regarding the search and seizure such as the premises or 
container to be search, describes the article and the like.293  However, the Bill states 
that a police official may search and access “an article identified in the warrant to the 
extent set out in the warrant.”294  This provision may have constitutional implications in 
that there is no limitation placed on the search which leaves the individual vulnerable 
to their personal information being accessed and violated.295 
 
It is submitted that this provision of the Bill has both positive and negative implications. 
On the positive side, in alignment with the nature of electronic evidence being 
intangible and its identity being difficult to ascertain, police officers have the leeway in 
describing the article to be seized in the warrant without the validity of the warrant 
being questioned. This allows police officers to conduct investigations in instances 
where they are uncertain of what the electronic evidence is and can search all devices 
instead of being restricted. However, warrants should not be too broad or vague as 
this may result in the warrant being declared null and void and set aside.296 
 
Currently, it is noted that the ‘Interim Standard Operating Procedures Dealing with 
Electronic Evidence’ and the ‘Practical Guide to Apply for Search Warrants in terms of 
the Provisions of Section 21 of the Criminal Procedure Act’ provide guidance to police 
officials to describe articles using the descriptions set out in the ECT Act such as 
“data”, “data message” and “information system”.297 
 
Another point to mention is that the Bill now changes a factor under which a search 
warrant is issued.  Currently, the CPA instructs that a magistrate or justice issue a 
warrant based on reasonable grounds of belief that the article to be seized is within 
                                            
292 As discussed in paragraph 2.2.2 (a) of Chapter 2 of this dissertation.  
293 Minister of Safety and Security v Van der Merwe 2011 (2) SACR 301 (CC). 
294 Section 27 (e) and (f) of the Bill. 
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the area of his/her jurisdiction.298 This was seen as ineffective in law enforcement as 
it resulted in the application of multiple warrants in respect of networked environments 
in cyberspace.299 The Bill now states that a magistrate or justice may issue a warrant 
on reasonable grounds of belief that an article is ‘within the Republic, if it is unsure 
within which area of jurisdiction the article is being used or is involved in the 
commission of an offence.’300 
 
In the writer’s view, this is a positive change to the current position as cybercrime takes 
place and electronic evidence lives in the cyber realm. With information on the internet 
being global, borderless and faceless,301 deciding the territory in which the crime was 
committed or where the electronic evidence is located is not an easy undertaking.302  
The Bill caters for mutual assistance in Chapter 6 to further mitigate against the trans-
border nature of electronic evidence.303   
 
Therefore, the search and seizure of electronic will be hastened without the excessive 
and uncertain procedure of first determining jurisdiction and then making applications 
for the necessary warrants. It is submitted that there is no judicial insight relating to 
this matter as the Bill is yet to be promulgated and warrants of this nature have yet to 
be applied for.  
 
2.6. Constitutional right to privacy and right to a fair trial 
 
The Bill specifically addresses privacy concerns by stating that the search and seizure 
powers bestowed upon police officials must be subject to ‘strict regard to decency and 
order; and with due regard to the rights, responsibilities and legitimate interests of other 
persons in proportion to the severity of the offence.’304 It is submitted that this provision 
                                            
298 Section 21 (1) (a) and Section 25(1) of the CPA. 
299 Basdeo (note 41 above). 
300 Section 27(1) (a) (bb) of the Bill. 
301 S Papadopoulos et al. (note 7 above, 334). 
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is in line with the Constitution as it provides as a safeguard against the invasion of 
privacy.  
 
The Bill further imposes an obligation on any person to provide technical or other 
assistance to a police official in order to conduct search and seizure procedures if 
required.305 Currently, under the ECT Act this obligation extends to the accused person 
whereby should the accused refuse to assist (for example by means of providing a 
password to unlock the electronic device) he/she would be guilty of an offence.306  This 
contradicted the right to a fair trial and the suspect’s privilege against self-incrimination.  
 
The difference between the Bill and the current legislative position is that the Bill 
specifically states that the person who is suspected to have committed the offence and 
is the subject of that investigation is not required to assist the police in this regard.307 
It is submitted that this new feature in the Bill addresses the previous challenge posed 
by the ECT Act and complies with the constitutional requirements of the right to a fair 
trial and the privilege against self-incrimination.   
 
2.7. Surveillance mechanisms used as search and seizure methods 
 
 
The introduction of Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of 
Communication Related Information Act (RICA)308 was pivotal in addressing 
information gathering309 of crime that was committed on the internet.310  This Act 
establishes the practice of surveillance of direct and indirect communications and the 
collection of information.311  This is done by interception, monitoring, data retention 
                                            
305 Section 32 (1) of the Bill. 
306 Section 82 (2) of the ECT Act. 
307 Ibid. 
308 Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of Communication Related 
Information Act 70 of 2002 (hereinafter referred to as “RICA”). 
309 This is a method of investigation. S Papadopoulos…et al. (note 7 above, 339).  
310 Ibid, 345. 
311 Ibid. 
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and decryption.312  It further brought about the prohibition of unlawful data interference 
or monitoring of data.313  
 
Currently, the exceptions to the general prohibition of unlawful interception is, amongst 
others: a directive being granted permitting the interception; consent being provided; 
for reasons such as the prevention of serious bodily harm or to determine location in 
emergency situations etc.314   
 
RICA provides for different directions and warrants, namely: 
 
 Interception direction;315 
 Real-time communication-related direction;316 
 Archived communication-related direction;317 
 Decryption direction;318 
 Entry warrant.319 
 
RICA is the only law in South Africa that governs communications signal 
interception.320 Interception of communication between two persons where consent is 
not provided is illegal if it is not approved by a judicial officer in terms of RICA.321 There 
are two types of interception that operates in South Africa. The first is bulk interception 
which involves ongoing monitoring of the communications of a large section of the 
population.322 The second is targeted inception which involves specific monitoring of a 
certain individual or group of individuals for a defined period of time.323 
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316 Section 17 of RICA. 
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The Bill now builds on and works together with RICA by introducing additional 
directions.324 The Bill changes the current legal position by setting out specific 
obligations on all electronic communications service providers325 whereas currently 
only fixed line operators were required to be interceptable and store communication-
related information.326 
 
Further to the above directions and warrant, the Bill creates three more directions that 
involve data that is reasonably believed to be involved in the commission of an 
offence327, namely: 
 
 expedited preservation of data direction - this direction involves preserving data 
for a period of 21 days.328  
 preservation of data direction - this direction serves as a less invasive measure 
than seizure and serves as an alternative means of investigation in instances 
where seizure of the article in question is not necessary.329  Under this direction 
data must be preserved for the period stipulated in the direction which cannot 
exceed 90 days. 330 
 disclosure of data direction331 – this direction is similar to that of the 
preservation of data direction in that it acts as an alternative to seizure of an 
article.332These preservation directions cater for instances whereby the 
electronic communications service providers is directed to freeze traffic data 
associated with an identified internet user for a certain period of time for a 
specific criminal investigation.333 Preservation relates to data that has already 
been stored. 
 
                                            
324 Section 38 of the Bill. 
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It is submitted that these directions are put in place as measures to ensure the 
availability or integrity of the evidence by preventing deletion, deterioration or 
modification.334 This serves as an enhancement of the current legal position and 
provides a more effective tool in the search and seizure of electronic evidence.   
 
However, it is submitted that, a criticism of these directions is that it imposes 
obligations on electronic communications service providers and financial institutions to 
develop their technology and systems to cater for the functionality to give effect to the 
direction.   
3. Conclusion  
 
It is submitted that the Bill aims to achieve the goal of addressing the lacunas in the 
current legislation and thereby resulting in successful prosecutions of cybercrime.  
However, this is dependent on whether the government is able to implement the 
provisions of the Bill by allocating the necessary resources required. 
 
Ultimately with focus specifically on the search and seizure of electronic evidence, it is 
submitted that the Bill addresses the gaps in the current legislation by providing 
mechanisms catered towards electronic evidence.  It further provides clarity of the 
definition of cyber specific terminology that also includes specific procedures 
associated with electronic evidence, however these definitions have yet to be 
interpreted and adjudicated upon.   
 
It is also beneficial to mention the new mutual assistance provisions that the Bill 
provides in its Chapter 6.  These provisions refer to the International Co-operation in 
Criminal Matters Act335 and sets out requirements and procedures in both instances of 
South Africa requesting assistance from foreign states as well as foreign states 
requesting assistance from South Africa.336 However, mutual assistance does not fall 
                                            
334 A Nieman (note 100 above, 56). 
335 1996. 
336 Memorandum on the objects of the Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill (2017) (note 26 above, 31). 
53 
 
 
within the scope of this research paper and is a broad enough to form standalone 
subject matter.  
 
Overall, the promulgation of the Bill in essence does not change the existing legislation 
but merely provides additional mechanisms that brings South Africa on par with 
technology even though technology is advancing at a faster rate that the law.  
 
CHAPTER FOUR - INTERNATIONAL BEST PRACTICE REGARDING SEARCH 
AND SEIZURE OF ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE  
1. Introduction 
 
 One of the reasons behind the introduction of formal cybercrime laws was the 
landmark incident of the early cybercrime attack, the ‘I LOVE YOU’ virus which was 
released in the year 2000.337  This virus took the form of an email entitled ‘I LOVE 
YOU’ which, when opened, swept through the victims’ computers destroying files and 
furthermore scanned the computers for passwords and log in credentials.338  The effect 
of this one virus resulted in damage worth billions of dollars and the interruption of 
corporate networks globally.339   
 
At the time of the occurrence of this incident the Philippine suspect could not be 
prosecuted in terms of any existing statutory cyber-crime, as this conduct was not 
criminalised according to law of the Philippines.340 Through this large scale cyber-
attack, it became evident that traditional laws were not equipped to deal with modern 
day crime on the internet which resulted in the culmination of various legal instruments 
being drafted.341 
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the Draft Convention on Cyber-Crime’ (2002) 25(3) Suffolk Transnational Law Review 493. 
339 Ibid. 
340 S Papadopoulos et al. (note 7 above, 338). 
341 S Papadopoulos et al. (note 7 above, 338). 
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A working group was established by Legal Ministers of various Commonwealth 
jurisdictions in 2000 to develop a model law that caters for electronic evidence and 
cyber-crime.342 The Commonwealth Model Law343 which took guidance from the 
legislation of Singapore and Canada was concluded in 2002. It specifically addresses 
search and seizure by stating that warrants may be issued to law enforcement officers, 
giving them the authority to search and/or seize computer data. 
 
The African Union Convention defines a framework in respect of standard proceedings 
that relate to information and telecommunications technologies.344 Further, this 
Convention provides conditions that should apply to the institution of proceedings 
specifically to cybercrime.345  Each State Party is prompted to adopt legislation that 
creates substantive ICT criminal offences and procedural measures to investigate and 
prosecute offenders as well as to afford legal capacity and statutory authority to 
institutions to perform functions such as forensic investigations and prosecutions 
relating to cybercrime.346 Even though South Africa has neither ratified nor signed the 
African Union Convention,347 it can take guidance from the provisions in the African 
Union Convention to inform the development of its own local legislation.  
 
The International Organisation on Computer Evidence proposed Principles for the 
Procedures Relating to Digital Evidence which serves as a solid foundation on which 
the handling of digital evidence can be based.348 These principles include, inter alia, 
elements of maintaining the integrity of the evidence, specialised training, and 
documentation of the search and seizure process.349 
 
In relation to the aspect of search and seizure of electronic evidence, one of the more 
practical guidance notes was created by INTERPOL, which provides insight into 
                                            
342 M Gercke Understanding cybercrime: phenomena, challenges and legal response ITU (2012) 27. 
343 Commonwealth Computer and Computer-related Crimes Model Law, 2002. 
344 African Union Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection, 2014. 
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aspects such as the phases of digital forensic investigations, challenges faced in the 
performance of search and seizure of digital evidence and corresponding potential 
solutions.350 Digital evidence being in the binary or analogue format goes further than 
the traditional computer based information.351 Therefore, one academic view is that, 
stretching and applying existing rules that govern conventional investigations of 
physical environments to digital evidence is inadequate.352  
 
It is beneficial for South Africa to have insight that is provided by the above guidance 
that has already made headway in this field. As the search and seizure of electronic is 
developing and dynamic area, South Africa should take guidance from abroad and 
must review international law developments. INTERPOL and the G8 illustrates 
practical recommendations to the search and seizure of electronic evidence which can 
feed into the drafting of Standard Operating Procedures for local law enforcement 
agencies in South Africa.  
2. The Cybercrime Convention353 
 
In addition to the above, the Convention on Cybercrime published by the Council of 
Europe is arguably the most relevant international cyber related legal instrument. The 
Convention was held in Budapest and was passed in June 2001 by the European 
Committee on Crime Problems.354 The Cybercrime Convention aims to, amongst other 
provisions, provide for domestic criminal procedural law powers that are required for 
investigation and prosecution of cybercrime and the collection of electronic evidence; 
and making provision for administration of international co-operation.355  
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353 Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime European Treaty Series – No. 185 (note 76 above). 
354 NE Marion ‘The Council of Europe’s Cyber Crime Treaty: An exercise in Symbolic Legislation’ 
International Journal of Cyber Criminology (2010) 4 701. See also MA Vatis (note 276 above, 209). 
355 Explanatory Report to the Convention on Cybercrime European Treaty Series No. 185 (note 77 
above). 
56 
 
 
South Africa, has not ratified356 the Cybercrime Convention yet but is a signatory to it 
meaning that it is not bound by the obligations of the Cybercrime Convention. 
However, Van der Merwe advises that South Africa has complied, through the ECT 
Act, with substantive treaty obligations,357 but has not yet complied with the 
international obligations (and is not required to) by not passing any legislation giving 
effect to the procedural law provisions.358  One of which being Article 19 where search 
and seizure of tangible objects must be equivalent to the search and seizure 
procedures of electronic data.359  
 
In my view, South Africa has analysed the requirements and recommendations set out 
in the Cybercrime Convention in the context of South Africa and drafted local 
legislation that will give effect to those requirements while simultaneously satisfying 
the South Africa’s socio-economic factors and political plight. This will be effected by 
the promulgation of the Bill which is expected to occur in 2018. It is submitted that once 
the Bill is enacted then South Africa would in essence be fully compliant with the 
requirements set out in the Cybercrime Convention.  
 
The Cybercrime Convention attempts to bring traditional concepts and cyber related 
terminology into alignment.360  This is depicted in the introduction of new terminology 
such as ‘search or similarly access’.361  The Cybercrime Convention defines search as 
‘to seek, read, inspect or review data’ whereas ‘access’ is deemed to be a more neutral 
term which accurately relates to computer terminology.362 Likewise, the term ‘seize 
and similarly secure’ has been introduced.363  Seize is deemed to include ‘the use or 
seizure of programmes needed to access the data being seized’ and similarly secure 
                                            
356 F Cassim ‘Addressing the spectre of cyber terrorism: a comparative perspective’ (2012)15(2) PER 
23. 
357 DP Van der Merwe … et al (note 12 above; 105). 
358 Ibid.  
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is said to denote ‘other means by which intangible data is removed, rendered 
inaccessible or its control is otherwise taken over in the computer environment’.364   
 
In comparison to South Africa, it is pertinent to note that the concepts of ‘similarly 
access’ and ‘similarly secure’ were not catered for by the ECT Act nor the CPA. 
However, the new Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill took guidance from the 
Cybercrime Convention in modelling its terminology after that of the Cybercrime 
Convention. The Bill defines ‘access’, ‘article’ and ‘seize’ using the same definitions 
provided by the Cybercrime Convention.365 
 
Article 19 of the Cybercrime Convention deals directly with the search and seizure of 
stored computer data.366 It ensures that the same efficiency that is achieved by 
traditional search and seizure procedures is accomplished by the search and seizure 
of electronic evidence.367 It does this by providing for the search and seizure of stored 
computer data which sets out, inter alia, the search and seizure of a computer system 
and the computer data stored on it; and a computer data storage medium.368  
 
Moreover, Article 19 ensures flexibility in investigations by providing that should an 
investigator come across relevant information that is stored on a different computer 
system which is not subject to the search, he/she has the authority to search the other 
system.369 Similarly, the ECT Act states that a cyber inspector can perform a search 
on any equipment where he/she has a reasonable cause to suspect that it has been 
used in connection with any offence.370 It is submitted that these provisions should be 
reviewed as it may result in law enforcement taking advantage of this flexibility by going 
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on fishing expeditions rather than using them as a means to ensure complete 
investigations.   
It is interesting to note that the 2015 version of the Bill included a similar provision 
which allowed a search to be conducted on the premises to the extent that it is was 
set out in the warrant, implying that the applicant did not need to know the exact 
location of the article.371 This provision is not featured in the 2017 version of the Bill 
which requires the location to be identified in the warrant.372  
 
Article 19 further includes the power to ‘seize or similarly secure a computer system’, 
‘make and retain a copy of those computer data’, ‘maintain the integrity of the relevant 
stored computer data’, and/or ‘render inaccessible or remove those computer data in 
the accessed computer system.’373 As mentioned above, it is submitted that these 
concepts have been implemented in the drafting of local legislation to enable a clearer 
and better understanding of these procedures in the cyber world. Further, it is 
submitted that the provisions of Article 19 provides perspective into the methods and 
measures that the search and seizure of electronic evidence should entail and guides 
local legislatures on what to include in their specific cybercrime investigative 
procedures. For example, seizure includes making copies of data, removal of a data 
storage medium and rendering inaccessible data as set out in the definition of seize 
itself.  
 
In addition the Cybercrime Convention makes provision for international co-operation 
which aligns with the South African International Co-operation in Criminal Matters Act 
and Chapter 6 of the Bill which sets out provisions pertaining to mutual assistance.374 
 
The Cybercrime Convention has been criticised for providing the surveillance method 
of data preservation whereas South Africa and other European Union countries 
provide for the surveillance method of data retention.375  The difference between the 
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two methods is that data retention encompasses the storage of traffic data that is 
currently generated for all users over a period of time irrespective of whether the 
person is suspected of a crime and may be kept in the user’s possession.376 Whereas 
data preservation refers to storage of traffic data specific to a certain user for the 
purposes of an investigation for a specific crime. This traffic data can only be preserved 
for a limited period and must be protected against modification, deletion, or 
deterioration.377 
 
Moving on from the Cybercrime Convention, it is advantageous to narrow down the 
view to specific jurisdictions to be able to gain a more practical understanding of how 
search and seizure of electronic evidence is dealt with internationally. For this purpose, 
the United States of America and Australia will be used in this comparative research. 
The United States of America is a nation that must be analysed as it is known for its 
fast and early development of technology which unfortunately also meant that it fell 
victim to cybercrime much sooner.378 As a result the legislature was quick to start 
creating laws to combat cybercrime.379   
 
It is submitted that as a result of the Bill incorporating the provisions of the Cybercrime 
Convention, South Africa will be compliant and should then ratify the Cybercrime 
Convention to express its intentions of appropriately dealing with cybercrime in a 
manner that is in line with international standards.  
 
3. United States of America (“USA”) 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
It is alleged that the United States of America has suffered the most at the hands of 
cybercrime.380  The USA became aware of its vulnerability as a result of various forms 
of online attacks which set off alarm bells among security agencies and law 
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enforcement agencies.381 It is for this reason that the USA is at the forefront in respect 
of the criminalisation of cyber-related offenses and the search and seizure of electronic 
evidence.382     
 
Initially, the USA commercialised the internet by leaving the regulatory governance of 
the internet to those who formed part of the internet community.383 However, it was 
soon discovered that this was not effective which led to the passing of two important 
statutes in the mid-1980s namely, the Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud 
and Abuse Act (“CFA Act”)384 and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“ECP 
Act”).385 The CFA Act and ECP Act deals with the substantive aspects of cybercrime.  
 
However, the actual focus of this chapter a comparative analysis is the procedural 
aspects of search and seizure of electronic evidence which is governed by: the Fourth 
Amendment;386 Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure;387 and the USA 
Patriot Act.388  
 
3.2. The Fourth Amendment 
 
The Fourth Amendment reads: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and no Warrants shall issue but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to 
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
The Fourth Amendment can be compared to South Africa’s constitutional right to 
privacy that serves as protection against unlawful search and seizures. In respect of 
privacy of an individual, the Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable and unlawful 
                                            
381A Minnaar (note 224 above, i). 
382 SC Sprinkel (note 349 above, 498). 
383 S Papadopoulos et al. (note 7 above, 338). 
384 Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFA Act”) 18 USC § 1030 (1986). 
385 Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“ECP Act”) 18 USC § 2510-2711 (1986). 
386 The Constitution of the United States, Amendment 4. 
387 Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Title VIII. Supplementary and Special Proceedings. Rule 41. 
Search and Seizure. 
388 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act 36 of 2001 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Patriot Act’). 
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searches and promotes a reasonable expectation that all searches will be conducted 
having due regard to privacy.389  The District court advised that the mandate of this 
Amendment is to showcase that the search and seizure is necessary to collect 
evidence in the investigation of a crime and that the collection of evidence justifies the 
invasion of an individual’s right to privacy.390   
 
With reference to cases involving electronic evidence, the courts had to decide 
whether the individual had a reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to the 
contents of their electronic mediums.391  In response to deciding on a reasonable 
expectation, the content of the electronic mediums was compared to closed containers 
such as briefcases and it was concluded that the same reasonable expectation of 
privacy that an individual possesses regarding the contents of a closed container 
applies to the data that may be held within an electronic storage device.392  This 
translates in practice to imply that data contained on a laptop is subject to a reasonable 
expectation of privacy. 
 
The Fourth Amendment is important in understanding what may be classified as a 
search. A challenge was posed to the American courts when deciding if the use of a 
pen register to capture a number dialed on a telephone constituted a search and 
infringed on the Fourth Amendment.393 Ultimately it was concluded that the 
communications were protected by the Fourth Amendment whereas the capturing of 
telephone numbers was not as the individual using the telephone service was aware 
that this information is accessible by the service provider therefore there is no 
reasonable expectation of privacy.394 This example shows that there are different types 
of searches even though no traditional physical intrusion took place.  
 
                                            
389 C Leacock (note 358 above, 222).  
390 United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 321 (1972). 
391 N Judish… et al Searching and Seizing Computers and Obtaining Electronic Evidence in Criminal 
Investigations 3ed, (2002) 3. 
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As technology advanced the courts were faced with further decisions on what 
constituted a search.  In Kyllo v United States,395 the court had to decide whether “the 
use of a thermal-imaging device aimed at a private home from a public street to detect 
relative amounts of heat within the home constitutes a ‘search’ within the meaning of 
the Fourth Amendment”. The court held that surveillance without physical intrusion is 
a search and if conducted without a warrant will be deemed as unreasonable.396 It is 
interesting to note the adaptability of the American courts to extend the meaning of 
search from only physical intrusions to surveillance. It is submitted that it is beneficial 
for South Africa to consider and explore the American courts’ approach of evaluating 
the circumstances in which the right to privacy applies and if the use of newly 
developed technology constitutes a search.  
 
Further, the particularity requirement reflects that warrants that do not describe with 
particularity the things to be seized renders the warrant invalid and results in a violation 
of the Fourth Amendment.397 The Court held that even the adequate description of the 
things to be searched does not save the warrant.398 It is advised that in order to satisfy 
the particularity requirement, search warrants that pertain to electronic evidence 
should identify/describe the physical hardware that is intended to be seized and/or the 
class of data/information that is intended to be searched.399  
 
The purpose behind the particularity requirement is to prevent searches that are too 
wide by limiting the search to specific areas and things.400 Computer searches 
challenges this limitation as the size of a hard drive with the capacity of forty gigabytes 
(for example) can store information that equates to approximately twenty million 
pages.401 Therefore, whereas, in the natural environment a search can be limited to a 
physical space such as a house or office, in electronic cases, the search of a computer 
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can result in searching vast amounts of information bypassing the limitation of the 
particularity requirement.402 
 
In comparison to South African law, currently a warrant is required to state with 
sufficient detail regarding the search and seizure. However, the proposed Bill moves 
away from this concept and allows for a search to be conducted for an article to the 
extent that it is identified in the warrant.403 It is clear that the Bill proposes a deviation 
from the norm and whether this deviation is a positive one can only be determined in 
future once it has been enacted, utilised, challenged and adjudicated upon. As it 
stands, this provision of the Bill may not pass South African and American 
constitutional muster.  
 
3.3. Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (“Rule 41”) 
 
Legal rules that govern search and seizure of evidence are set out in Rule 41 of the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.404 The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
govern and are applicable to all categories of criminal proceedings that take place in 
the federal courts.405 It can be likened to the provisions of the CPA in South Africa. A 
provision of Rule 41 is to search electronic storage media, seize electronically stored 
information, where such media or information is concealed through technological 
means or where protected computers have been damaged without authorisation.406   
 
It is drafted to include electronic evidence in stating that a warrant may be issued to 
utilise ‘remote access to search electronic storage media and to seize or copy 
electronically stored information’ in the event that the location of the information or 
media is concealed via technological means or in an investigation that relates to media 
in damaged protected computers.407 Even though the CPA can be applied to matters 
concerning electronic evidence, it is interesting to note that USA criminal procedure 
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explicitly includes cyber related terminology and procedures leaving no room for doubt. 
Further, the Bill does not refer to remote searches.  
In practice, a remote search would entail software being remotely installed on a device 
and thereby being able to obtain the IP address and/or the identification of information 
specific to that device.408 It is a concern that this provision does not address the 
constitutional aspects that the Fourth Amendment require, such as specific 
descriptions in the warrant, resulting in this being left to the interpretation of the 
courts.409 As mentioned above, remote searches are also an extension of the 
traditional concept of a search that South Africa should take cognisance of and maybe 
even include in the drafting of the Standard Operating Procedures that inform the 
search and seizure of electronic evidence.   
 
In addition to the application for a warrant the USA has adopted a plain view exception 
which affords investigators the opportunity to obtain evidence related to a different 
offence once the search has been executed consistently as per the warrant.410  The 
court ruled in favour of the state in a case where evidence was seized based on the 
contraband being in plain view despite it not being described in the warrant.411 As 
discussed above, currently South Africa is aligned as the ECT Act has a similar 
provision even though it has never been implemented.  
 
3.4. Patriot Act  
 
The Patriot Act was passed by Congress in 2001 in response to the September 11 
terror attacks.412 The Patriot Act is said to improve counter-terrorism efforts in several 
ways, one of which is by updating the law to address new technologies and threats 
that may be posed by the cyber realm.413 Further, the Patriot Act enhances the powers 
                                            
408 Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules, 2015 Seattle, WA available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/cr2015-09_0.pdf. 
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of law enforcement agencies enabling them to search telephone records and email 
communications.414 The Patriot Act can be used as a benchmark to measure the South 
African Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill against as it was drafted specifically to 
address cyberspace and technology as set out below.  
 
Prior to the Patriot Act, warrants could only be obtained from the district where the 
intended search was to be conducted,415 however the Patriot Act now provides that 
warrants in relation to terrorist activities can be obtained from any district irrespective 
of where the execution of the warrant will take place.416 This provision caters for the 
fact that terrorist investigations span different jurisdictions resulting in law enforcement 
officers being unnecessarily delayed by applying for multiple warrants in each 
district.417 Another provision specific to cybercrime is that computer hacking victims 
are now allowed to approach law enforcement and request assistance in respect of 
monitoring trespassers on their electronic devices.418   
 
This change in the law brings into alignment the crime of physical trespassing to that 
of electronic trespassing in the form of hacking and provides victims with the same 
means of remediation.419 South Africa can adapt and find support in this approach 
introduced by the Patriot Act to extend the jurisdiction of the application of warrants 
relating to electronic evidence to a national level. The proposed Bill already contains 
this provision as discussed in chapter 3. The implication of this is that the magistrates 
who grant warrants can do so for searches and seizures that are outside their regional 
jurisdiction, thereby overcoming the challenge of pinpointing the physical locations of 
crimes that take place in the virtual realm.  
 
Finally, it is noted that USA experiences a similar challenge to South Africa in terms of 
the lack of successful convictions.420  It is submitted that even though the USA had 
cybercrime specific legislation in place, it was still able to adapt and bring about 
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improvements to the existing legislation when gaps were exposed by the 11 
September 2001 terrorists’ attack.  In the same light, South Africa should be able to 
timeously effect necessary changes in legislation in order to address the lacunas that 
are exposed at present and those that will become exposed even after the 
promulgation of the Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill. In addition, South Africa can 
take guidance on practices such as thermal imaging and remote searches and note 
how those practices interact with legislation.   
4. Australia 
4.1. Introduction 
 
Technology also posed manifold problems for Australia in respect of search and 
seizure resulting in new techniques being employed in the investigation of criminal 
activity.421  Similarly to the USA, Australia effected change to its legislation by 
amending the Crimes Act422 in 1989 to cater for offences relating to computers.423  
 
Further to the Crimes Act, the Electronic Evidence Act424  sets out the definition of data 
and electronic records and provides for aspects such as authentication, integrity and 
admissibility of electronic evidence.  For purposes of this research paper the Crimes 
Act and the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act425 are discussed as 
they are the core pieces of legislation that deals directly with search and seizure.  
 
4.2. Crimes Act 
 
The Crimes Act can be compared to the CPA and ECT Act. The Crimes Act sets out 
multiple provisions dealing with search and seizure of evidence in criminal 
investigations.426  The Act firstly defines data as ‘information in any form; and any 
program (or part of a program)’ and defines data storage device as ‘a thing containing 
                                            
421 A Mason “Reform of the criminal law in Australia” 1989 Commonwealth Law Bulletin 1015. 
422 Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) 1015. 
423 JB Hill and NE Marion (note 10 above, 38). 
424 Electronic Evidence Act, 2002 also cited as the Model Law on Electronic Evidence by the 
Commonwealth Office of Civil and Criminal Justice Reform. 
425 Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth). 
426G Urbas and KR Choo (note 83 above, 53). 
67 
 
 
or designed to contain data for use by a computer.’427 This reflects how the ECT Act 
currently attempts to define electronic evidence by defining data.  
Furthermore, the evidential material to be searched for needs to be identified in a 
search warrant428 and such evidential material includes evidence in electronic form.429  
This direction can bring about defence techniques for example should computer discs 
be seized without first establishing the presence of evidential material on them, the 
defence may argue inadmissibility of the evidence as seen in the case of R v PJ.430 
Even though this provision does not align with the Cybercrime Convention, it holds law 
enforcement accountable to ensure that the procedure that it follows in respect of 
applying for warrants and carrying out the search and seizure is done with due 
diligence. South Africa has taken the same approach.  
 
Part IAA deals with the general powers of search and seizure but also provides for 
specific regulations when dealing with electronic evidence in s3K and s3L.431 
Executing officers are allowed to take any equipment onto the warrant premises that 
is necessary for the examination or processing of a thing that is present on the 
premises in order to assess if such thing is covered by the warrant and may be 
seized.432 Another provision is that ‘a thing found at the premises may be moved to 
another place for examination or processing in order to determine whether it may be 
seized under a warrant….’433   
 
This regulation came under scrutiny in Hart v Commissioner AFP434 where the court 
concluded that this section did not permit the copying of data files to the storage 
devices that were brought to the premises and then moved to another location for the 
purpose of analysis. The drafting of this section resulted in significant limitations being 
imposed on searches that are conducted solely based on s3K because it does not 
allow for the above scenario where a device is brought onto the premises for the 
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purposes of copying the data onto it and then taken to a different location for 
analysis.435 
 
A further provision refers to any electronic equipment already present at the warrant 
premises may be used to access data should that data be deemed on reasonable 
grounds as evidential material and if that data is then suspected to be evidence then 
the executing officer may copy the data in question to a device that was brought to the 
premises and then taken away for analysis.436  This provision clearly compensates for 
s3K which led to the decision that the legislation does not intend for the searches to 
be based on either section and be mutually exclusive but can rely on both sections.437 
 
The executing officer may also apply for an order which requires a specific person 
(whether it be, inter alia, the suspect in the investigation or the owner of the electronic 
equipment) to assist in accessing, copying or converting the data that is held in a 
computer or data storage device.438 These provisions together with other cyber specific 
provisions were introduced into the Crimes Act by the Cybercrime Act.439  The above 
are relevant to South Africa as they can be used as examples of how these provisions 
work together to address gaps in the law. In a similar manner the provisions of the 
CPA, the ECT Act and the Bill can be used to holistically cover the search and seizure 
of electronic evidence. In addition, it is noted that the Bill aligns with Australia to the 
extent of providing for the copying of data instead of the removal of equipment. 
However, the Bill contrasts with Australian law by excluding a suspect from the 
obligation of assisting the police in an investigation thus complying with the South 
African constitutional right to fair trial.    
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4.3. Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act440 
 
The TIAA operates in the same manner as RICA in South Africa therefore it is relevant 
to review this piece of legislation to evaluate if South African legislation is on par with 
Australian legislation insofar as the interception and monitoring of information is 
concerned. 
 
An aspect of search now includes surveillance methods as previously mentioned 
above therefore the TIAA was introduced to govern intercepting telecommunications 
for the purposes of law enforcement.441  The TIAA provides for the issuance of two 
different types of warrants: firstly the telecommunication service warrant which only 
applies to the interception of a single service at a time such as one telephone 
number.442 Secondly, a named person warrant which applies to the interception of 
multiple telecommunication services that is relevant to a specific person.443 These 
interception warrants can be issued in respect of only serious offences which includes 
cybercrime offences.444 RICA and the proposed Bill cater for different types of warrants 
that speak to decryption, entry and preservation of data. In this regard it can be said 
that South African legislation more extensively provides for surveillance and 
interception of technology methods.  
 
The relationship between law enforcement and ISPs in Australia is subject to 
preserving evidence, monitoring internet traffic and providing help in respect of three 
instances: 1) the enforcement of criminal laws; 2) the protection of public revenue; and 
3) the safeguarding of national security.445 Should law enforcement compel ISPs to 
assist then a warrant is required.446 However, the challenge exists in that not all ISPs 
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are obliged to record data logs that are used in an investigation to track data 
transfers.447  
 
In South Africa the same relationship exists between law enforcement and electronic 
communications service providers and financial institutions. To avoid the challenge 
that Australia experiences, the proposed Bill in South Africa places an obligation on 
electronic communications service providers and financial institutions to put in place 
technology that enables the implementation of surveillance and interception. Law 
enforcement need to be vigilant when conducting a search and seizure as should 
evidence be gathered in breach of the TIAA, then that specific evidence will be 
rendered inadmissible.448 
5. Conclusion 
It is clear that international best practice is moving forward at a faster rate that South 
African legislative practices in terms of the search and seizure of electronic evidence. 
South Africa is nonetheless developing its future legislation (the Bill as discussed in 
the previous chapter) taking most of its direction from the Cybercrime Convention.  
 
Due to the drastic increase in cybercrime, it is essential that law enforcement officers 
and prosecutors understand the procedure of obtaining electronic evidence that is 
stored in computers.449 Therefore, the role of law enforcement officers need to include 
the prevention of and responding to cyber threats and attacks.450 This can be done by 
the limitation of the scope of cybercriminals by creating awareness and equipping 
potentials victims so that they can protect themselves against cybercrime as well as 
the investigation and the identification of cybercriminals.451 
 
With regard to the law of the USA, South Africa should take cognisance of the way in 
which the American courts address the aspect of reasonable expectation of privacy 
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applicable to electronic storage devices and mediums as well as what constitutes a 
search in terms of using electronic tools in an investigation and whether or not it is 
covered by law.452 Further, it is noted that the promulgation of the Bill will bring South 
African legislation into alignment with American law by catering for searches that can 
be executed in a jurisdiction different from where it was granted.  
 
Australia aims to prioritise the adoption of strategies which encourage people to report 
cybercrime incidents, conducting awareness campaigns, creating reporting portals via 
the web and introducing cybercrime hotlines.453 Further, it is submitted that South 
Africa should pay attention to the surveillance method of investigation used by 
Australia and the different warrants that can be applied for. It is noted that South Africa 
will be in contrast to Australian law with the promulgation of the Bill by not subjecting 
a suspect to the provision of obliging with the request of assistance by the police in an 
investigation.  
CHAPTER FIVE - CONCLUSION 
1. Introduction 
 
This dissertation critically analysed the current and future legal position in South Africa 
regarding the search and seizure of electronic evidence, and is based on the following 
premise: the lack of cybercrime convictions in South Africa is directly linked to the 
inadequacy of the current legislation that governs search and seizure of electronic 
evidence. The following conclusions have been drawn in light of the above.  
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2. Does the current legislation in South Africa adequately address the search 
and seizure of electronic evidence?  
In South Africa, there is no standard definition of electronic evidence. The ECT Act 
makes provision for “data” and “data message” but does not expressly define what 
constitutes electronic evidence.  
 
In terms of constitutionality, search and seizure affects the rights to a fair trial and 
privacy. However, should a search and seizure be carried out lawfully, then the 
infringement of Constitutional rights is justifiable.  
 
Bouwer submits that search and seizure of electronic evidence is divided into two 
steps. The first being the search for the physical electronic equipment, and the second 
being, the removal of the physical electronic equipment to a different location to then 
undergo a different search and seizure of the electronic evidence that is located 
therein. As a result of the CPA being designed to operate in the physical world, the 
search and seizure provisions adequately cover the first step of search and seizure of 
the physical electronic equipment but fails at the second search where the particularity 
required is not set out in the warrant detailing, inter alia, the identity of the searcher.454  
 
In addition, sufficient particularity plays a vital role in the application for a warrant, 
therefore the articles and premises to be seized must be described with sufficient detail 
in order for all parties to be aware of the subject of the searches. Currently, it is unclear 
as to the terminology that is required when describing the articles and premises in the 
warrant. Consequently, the CPA lacks clarity regarding search and seizure of 
electronic evidence and requires amendment.  
 
With regard to the ECT Act, it is submitted that even though it provided a degree of 
clarity and certainty by defining cyber related terminology and search and seizure 
procedures specific to electronic evidence, it limited the use of this Act to the cyber 
inspector who never materialised.455 It is submitted that even if the ECT Act adequately 
addressed the search and seizure of electronic evidence, the impact of its investigative 
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provisions was never fully realised as a result of it not being practically implemented. 
However, in spite of the above, SAPS have been carrying out search and seizures of 
electronic evidence therefore the law is not wholly redundant.456  
 
In conclusion, the current legal position regarding the CPA can be applied to the search 
and seizure of electronic evidence, while the cyber specific investigative provisions of 
the ECT Act lie dormant and therefore ineffective. It is thus fair to conclude that the 
current legislative position is not wholly inadequate but is in fact more incomplete. As 
a result, the current legislation should be amended to provide certainty and 
consistency in the search and seizure of electronic evidence. However, it is submitted 
that it does not have to be as the promulgation of the Bill will remedy this.  
In addition, with regard the Bouwer’s two-step process, it is submitted that a single 
warrant be used with both searches and seizures clearly identified and all details 
relating to the different locations and searchers identified with sufficient particularity.  
3. Will the proposed Bill change the current legal position in South Africa?  
 
In terms of providing clarity and certainty, the Bill defines cyber terminology that 
enhances the existing position set out in the ECT Act and the CPA. These definitions 
leads to a clearer understanding of what constitutes electronic evidence and the 
processes involved in the seizure of electronic evidence.457 
 
One of the main features that will change the existing legal position is that the Bill 
formally requires the creation and implementation of Standard Operating Procedures 
that will guide law enforcement regarding the search and seizure of electronic 
evidence.458 It is noted that interim standard operating procedures have already been 
drafted459 which will inform and accelerate the drafting of the final Standard Operating 
Procedures.   
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Another change introduced by the Bill, is the absence of the cyber inspector and 
reference to police officials. Currently, the ECT Act set out powers that were 
specifically given to the cyber inspector. In the writer’s view, this is a positive change 
as after the promulgation of the Bill, police officials will have cyber specific powers, 
such as using decryption keys, computer programs and computer data storage 
mediums to access and seize an article that is identified in the warrant.460 This is an 
important advancement as it extends the powers of the already existing police officials 
rather than trying to create a new persona that governs the search and seizure of 
electronic evidence. In addition, the Bill makes provision for the establishment of two 
new organisations461 that will assist the police in their investigations.462  
 
With regards to a search warrant, a point of growth in the legislation is that now judicial 
officers can grant warrants to be executed outside their regional jurisdiction to the 
extent that the warrant is executed within the Republic.463 This mitigates against the 
trans-border nature of electronic evidence and the inability to speedily pinpoint its exact 
location. 
 
The Bill aligns with the constitutional right to a fair trial by not putting a suspect in the 
position where s/he is obliged to assist the police official with the investigation and 
provide log in credentials to access the desired electronic evidence. This guards 
against an accused’s right against self-incrimination. Further, the Bill adds to the 
existing surveillance directions provided for by RICA. Consequently, the Bill amplifies 
the existing legislation.  
 
The only issue that the Bill may face is that it does not align with the requirement of a 
warrant describing articles with sufficient detail and particularity. The Bill allows for the 
search of an article to the extent that it is identified in the warrant.464 It is submitted that 
this can result in one of two things: firstly it can prove to be successful in allowing for 
the search and seizure of articles that the police are unable to accurately describe in 
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the warrant; or police officials can take advantage of the leniency in descriptions and 
attempt to do blanket searches covering all their bases instead of being specific in their 
searches.  
 
Overall, it is concluded that the Bill enhances and amplifies the already existing 
processes and procedures. It brings about a certain degree of legal certainty in 
understanding technology and empowers police officials to perform the search and 
seizure of electronic evidence. The Bill proves that South Africa is adapting and 
developing its legislation to keep abreast of technology advances. In light of the 
practical implementation, the Bill is not a quick fix and will not be able to remedy the 
low investigation and prosecution rate of cybercriminals in the near future.  Much has 
to be done on the part of the government, law enforcement and the judiciary as joint 
efforts to tackle the implementation head on.465 
4. Does South Africa align with international best practice and what lessons can 
be learnt?   
The following points can be concluded from the comparison of South African law to 
international best practice:466 
 When the Bill is promulgated, South Africa will satisfy the procedural obligations 
set out in the Cybercrime Convention and should therefore ratify this treaty to 
display that its attitude towards addressing cybercrime is of a serious nature.  
 
 South Africa currently aligns with the particularity requirement and the 
specificity that ensures the validity of a warrant. However, the Bill slightly 
deviates from this in allowing a search for articles that are identified to the extent 
set out in the warrant. Therefore, it allows flexibility in the knowledge of what is 
to be searched. This still needs to be adjudicated upon to test its effectiveness 
in practice.  
 
                                            
465 See paragraph 6.2 below. 
466 All conclusions derived from Chapter 4 of this dissertation. 
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 South Africa can explore the different types of electronic searches such as 
remote searches and thermal imaging. This should be included in operating 
procedures or guidelines for search and seizure of electronic evidence as 
currently this is lacking. To entrench these types of searches, the existing 
legislation needs to be amended to cater for same or it should be included in 
the Bill before it is promulgated.  
 
 Currently in South Africa, legislation permits searches to be executed in the 
jurisdiction that they were applied for. However, the Bill, which aligns with 
American law, now caters for the granting of warrants to be executed in a 
different jurisdiction overcoming the borderless nature of electronic evidence. 
 
 Further, it is noted that prominent issues such as cyber-attacks are addressed 
timeously by legislative intervention in other jurisdictions which are able to make 
quick decisions in terms of enacting legislation. South Africa is far from this as 
the first draft of the Bill was published in 2015 and has yet to be enacted in law.  
 
It is clear that international best practice is moving forward at a faster rate than South 
African legislative practices in terms of the search and seizure of electronic evidence. 
South Africa is nonetheless developing its future legislation (the Bill as discussed in 
the previous chapter) taking most of its direction from the Cybercrime Convention. 
However, the investigative measures and certain legislative aspects such as what 
constitutes a search still needs to be addressed. 
5. Overall conclusion  
 
In light of the above, there is no need for South Africa to amend the current legislation 
governing search and seizure of electronic evidence in light of the CPA currently being 
used to search and seize electronic evidence and the proposed, imminent 
promulgation of the Bill.  
 
It is submitted that the lack of cybercrime convictions may be attributed to the 
inadequate implementation of the existing legislation such as the defunct cyber 
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inspector. Therefore, it is more the practical application of the law than the actual law 
itself that needs to be improved. Consequently, it is submitted that South Africa needs 
to attend to the equipping and upskilling of its law enforcement officers with respect to 
specific computer forensics models and methods of search and seizure of electronic 
evidence to be able to implement the provisions of the Bill.  
6. Recommendations  
6.1. Legislative recommendations 
 
It is highly recommended that the promulgation of the Bill be prioritised as it will bring 
about practical changes in the implementation of search and seizure of electronic 
evidence. Even though the Bill does not change the current legislation it certainly adds 
to the existing provisions.  
 
The concept of electronic evidence should be defined and standardised amongst all 
areas of law to provide clarity and consistency on how the law interacts with this type 
of evidence. Practical recommendations that speak to investigative tools and 
measures are set out below:- 
 
In addition, there needs to be significant training and upskilling of law enforcement and 
other stakeholders. Continuous training needs to occur as cybercrime and electronic 
evidence is a developing field that is constantly changing therefore stakeholders need 
to keep abreast with technological developments that may have an impact on this 
field.467 
 
6.2. Practical recommendations 
 
One of the specialist investigative tools used in cybercrime investigations is computer 
forensics which comprises of four elements, namely, ‘identification, preservation, 
analysis and presentation.’468 In terms of the procedure of collecting evidence in the 
context of a cybercrime, it is advised that investigators use the method of firstly seizing 
                                            
467 M Gercke (note 354 above, 187). 
468 A R Stanfield The Authentication of Electronic Evidence (unpublished LLM Thesis, Queensland 
University of Technology (2016) 124. 
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evidence that is stored on third-party servers, next prospective surveillance, and finally 
forensic investigation of the electronic equipment.469  
 
It has been determined that electronic evidence has the following qualities: it is latent 
in nature similar to biometric and DNA evidence; it can easily and with speed transcend 
borders; it is fragile in the sense that it can be damaged, destroyed or altered; and it 
can be time-sensitive.470  Therefore, the following are examples of some of the 
precautions that should be taken when seizing electronic evidence: refrain from 
handling contacts, bending connections and exposing electronic evidence to magnetic 
fields or extreme heat or cold; and avoid attempting to view the contents of the 
electronic medium without first obtaining assistance from a qualified computer/forensic 
analyst.471 
In the case of Ohio v Cook, it was argued that integrity of the data seized was 
compromised in that the hard drive was placed in a static bag.472 The court held that 
in these circumstances the data was intact as it was authenticated that the copy made 
matched the original.473 In this case the argument failed, however, it is possible that 
electronic evidence can be damaged if not carefully seized and stored.474 
 
The U.S Department of Justice introduced a forensics process model that sets out four 
different phases during an investigation.475  These four phases are collection (search, 
recognition, collection and documentation); examination (uncovering hidden 
information); analysis (examination of probative value and significance); and 
reporting.476 
 
                                            
469 O S Kerr (note 408 above, 285). 
470 U.S Department of Justice ‘Electronic Crime Scene Investigation: A Guide for First Responders’ 2001 
NIJ Guide 6. 
471 National Forensic Science Technology Center “Crime Scene Investigation, A Guide for Law 
Enforcement’ September 2013 available at 
https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/forensics/Crime-Scene-Investigation.pdf, accessed 
on 22 October 2017. 
472 Ohio v. Brian Cook, 149 Ohio App. 3d 422; 2002. 
473 Ibid. 
474 M Meyers and M Rogers “Computer Forensics: The Need for Standardization and Certification” 
2004(3)2 International Journal of Digital Evidence 1-11. 
475 V Baryamureeba and F Tushabe (note 36 above, 2). 
476 Ibid. 
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Another proposed model more specific to a digital crime scene consists of four different 
phases.477  The first phase is preservation for later synchronisation and further 
analysis.478  The second is a survey phase which identifies and separates potentially 
useful data.479  The third phase is search and collection which entails use of software 
tools.480 The last phase is documentation.481 
 
Routine procedures have been developed by digital evidence specialists such as an 
exact duplication of all information stored on a hard drive to ensure accuracy and string 
searches.482 A fundamental of the forensic computing process is the copying of 
evidence.483 Therefore search and seizure that applies to a computer system and/or 
stored device, includes making a copy of the data and maintaining its integrity.484 
Further, string searches are used to mitigate against the difficult task of searching 
through storage mediums that may contain a numerous amount of data files and 
information.485 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
477 Ibid, 4. 
478 Ibid. 
479 Ibid. 
480 Ibid. 
481 Ibid. 
482 C Leacock (note 363 above, 222). 
483 G Urbas and KR Choo (note 83 above, 50). 
484 A Maurushat (note 458 above, 451).  
485 G Urbas and KR Choo (note 83 above, 53). 
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